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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Private equity (PE) firms have increased their global presence significantly in the last few 
decades urging researchers to study the implications of private equity ownership in a firm’s 
performance and operations. Prior research (e.g. Brav & Gompers, 1997; Guo et al., 2011) has 
extensively covered e.g. the ways in which private equity owners generate wealth during their 
management stage and how private equity-backed companies perform in the stock market after 
the PE owner has exited the portfolio company through an initial public offering (IPO). Further, 
the reputational concerns of private equity owners as repeat backers in IPOs and repeat 
borrowers through leveraged buyouts (LBOs) has perplexed researchers as reputational 
concerns seem to outweigh PE investors’ equity maximizing practices (e.g. Cain et al., 2012). 
However, although private equity owners commonly raise debt for their portfolio companies, 
fairly little is documented on the relationship between PE owners and bondholders after the 
company has gone public.  
 
Huang et al. (2016) study this relationship using a sample consisting solely of US-based 
companies and find that, although private equity owners are known for their equity value 
maximizing practices, they are also very concerned about their reputation as repeat borrowers 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Cain et al., 2012). Huang et al. (2016) find that due to the PE 
owners’ frequent interaction with debt investors, private equity-backed companies receive bond 
financing with on average 70 basis points lower yield spreads than other companies do, 
suggesting that their owners’ long-term reputational concerns outweigh the hunt for short-term 
returns. Huang et al. (2016) find evidence that the less expensive financing and better credit 
quality stem partially from the less aggressive investment and dividend policies that PE-backed 
companies have adopted. This behavior of implementing governance structures that act in favor 
of the owners’ reputation is commonly referred to as the reputation effect.  
 
Given the private equity firms’ significant operations outside the US, my motivation for this 
thesis is to first bring the study of Huang et al. (2016) to the European context, contrast my 
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findings with their results from the more established American private equity industry1 and 
finally amend the scope of the previous study by examining whether the effects of private equity 
ownership are also visible in the loan market of the more bank-centered Europe2. Thereby, I 
aim to answer the question of whether European debt investors view private equity owners as 
large exploitative shareholders that take advantage of their portfolio companies’ bondholders, 
leading to investors demanding higher yield spreads on the PE-backed companies’ debt. 
Further, I ask whether the reputation effect among PE owners is as strong in Europe as it is in 
the US, where private equity firms are highly concerned about their reputation and where, by 
implementing bondholder-friendly investment and payout policies, PE portfolio companies 
have achieved better credit metrics when compared to non-PE-backed companies. Finally, due 
to the nature of the European debt market, I ask whether the effect of private equity ownership 
on credit metrics also transfers to the European loan market. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
Private equity and venture capital investments have been a source of companies’ financing for 
decades, but the PE industry has experienced an explosive growth over the last 30 years. Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) conclude that while annual PE investment amounted to less than $10 billion 
in 1991, the amount had grown to over $180 billion at its peak year in 2000. Metrick and Yasuda 
(2010) report that by the year 2010, global private equity investment stood at approximately $1 
trillion and with the industry’s significant propensity to lever their investments, total investment 
size can reach up to $4 trillion. The industry has been largely focused on the North American 
markets in the past with approximately over 85% of private equity funds residing in the US 
(Robinson and Sensoy, 2011). However, private equity activity has also increased in Europe 
over the last few decades with average annual investments amounting to €50 billion between 
2013 and 2015 and the total investment stood at €560 billion in 2015 (Invest Europe, 2015)  
 
Private equity funds typically operate in four distinct stages. In the fundraising stage, PE funds 
source equity investments from institutional investors and wealthy individuals to grow their 
fund for future investments made in the next stage. The investment phase generally begins after 
                                                          
1 Prior Private Equity research has shown the US to have the most prominent and established PE industry (e.g. 
Armour and Cumming, 2006; Cumming and Walz, 2010).  
2 Bank loans amount to nearly 45% of corporate debt in Europe and less than 20% in the US due to the lack of 
public data on firms’ creditworthiness in Europe and the great efficiency of banks acquiring the private information 
(De Fiore and Uhlig, 2005). 
3 
 
 
 
the fund has reached its target size and the PE investors start sourcing for companies that meet 
their investment criteria, which is then followed by acquisitions of chosen portfolio companies. 
In the third management stage, PE owners are actively involved in the company’s operational 
decisions and management for a predetermined holding period. Usually after the holding period 
is over, PE owners sell their ownership, usually to a strategic or financial buyer or take the 
company public through an IPO. (Invest Europe, 2015). As private equity investors are actively 
involved with institutional investor and lenders in all of the four stages, reputational aspects are 
crucial in securing successful continuation of their business in the long-term (e.g. Gompers, 
1996; Brav and Gompers, 1997). 
 
1.3 Contribution to existing literature 
 
This thesis builds upon and amends four main areas of research. First, the post-IPO performance 
of private equity-backed companies has been widely covered, especially from the equity market 
performance view (e.g. Cao and Lerner, 2009; Krishnan et al., 2011; Levis, 2011), however, by 
analyzing the credit metrics and post-IPO governance structures of private equity portfolio 
companies, this thesis offers unique insight into the post-IPO credit market performance of 
European private equity-backed companies. Second, this thesis complements the existing 
literature on ownership structure and cost of debt (e.g. Aslan and Kumar, 2012; Elyasiani et al., 
2010; Lin et al., 2011) by providing evidence on the cost of debt for European private equity-
backed firms.  
 
Third, this study further examines the reputational concerns of PE firms that affect the way they 
govern their portfolio companies (e.g. Cain et al., 2012; Demiroglu and James, 2010; Diamond, 
1989; Tyková and Borell, 2012) by providing insight into the topic from the European private 
equity owners’ reputational concerns. Fourth, the thesis adds to the literature on wealth transfers 
through investment and payout policy decisions (e.g. Harford and Kolasinski, 2014; Kalay, 
1982; Maxwell and Stephens, 2003) by studying the investment and payout decisions 
(dividends and share repurchases) of private equity-backed companies following a large influx 
of capital through a bond issue.  
 
Further, this thesis also carefully analyzes the similar study conducted by Huang et al. (2016) 
on private equity investors’ reputational concerns in the US and makes three contributions to 
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their research. First, using a larger data set3, I expand the geographic reach of the topic by 
studying the implications of PE investors’ reputation effect in Europe. Second, Huang et al. 
(2016) only conduct their study with public bonds, whereas I analyze a novel data set of 
European corporate loans4. Finally, with the paper by Huang et al. (2016) only testing for the 
exploitative behavior of PE ownership with investments and dividend payments after a bond 
issuance, my novel share repurchase data set complements the methodology by introducing the 
preferred payout method of sponsor-backed companies5 into the scope of the analysis.  
 
1.4 Main findings and limitations 
 
This thesis finds debt investors to view European private equity ownership somewhat 
differently from the North American PE ownership and makes three main findings in this space. 
First, bond yield spreads (loan spreads) for European PE-backed companies are on average 93 
pp (70 pp) higher when comparing to the general set of other IPO companies over the first six 
years after their IPO. Second, European private equity-sponsored firms are rated on average 
two notches lower than their non-sponsor counterparts by Moody’s during the first six years 
after the company has been listed. Finally, private equity-backed companies invest less and pay 
lower amounts of dividends over the three-year period following a debt issuance relative to the 
size of the firms, when compared to the non-PE-sponsored firms.  
 
Thus, although I find that the European private equity-owned companies are viewed inherently 
riskier in terms of their credit metrics compared to the non-sponsor-backed firms, I observe no 
evidence of exploitative governance structures in PE-backed companies and argue that the 
reputation effect plays a vital role in ensuring that bondholder friendly governance structures 
are implemented in PE portfolio companies.  
 
Evidence form the North American market (Huang et al., 2016) is slightly conflicting and 
suggests that PE-backed companies have better credit ratings, receive bond financing with 
lower yields. Further, they invest more modestly and pay out less dividends in the three years 
after a debt issuance, when compared to the non-PE-sponsored companies. My analysis yields 
                                                          
3 My focused sample of European bond observations amounts to 486, whereas Huang et al. have a data set of 
329 individual bond observations from the US. 
4 My focused sample of European corporate loans features 192 individual loan observations.  
5 Jain et al. (2009) report that venture capital-backed companies were significantly more likely to repurchase 
shares than pay out dividends. 
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novel results to the European market on PE-sponsored firms’ credit ratings and cost of debt and 
confirms the earlier findings by Harford and Kolasinski (2014) and Huang et al. (2016) that PE 
owners do not exploit bondholders by transferring wealth through overinvestment and 
excessive payout policies.  
 
This thesis introduced two novel aspects that have not been researched in the setting of private 
equity ownership prior to this study, i.e. my corporate loan sample as well as accounting for 
share repurchases as one of the payout methods. However, the corporate loan sample proved to 
be rather thin on observations on private equity-backed companies, especially in the focused 
sampling period, which slightly affects the comparability of the two debt types. Additionally, 
although the loan data set should be cleaned of any non-withdrawn loans, there is a chance of 
loans of this type ending up in the final sample and their dissimilar pricing structure might have 
its effect the loan spread analysis. Further, fact that they are not actually withdrawn might 
distract from obtaining a proper results for the investment and payout policy analyses that rely 
strongly on the date when the loan was withdrawn by analyzing the subsequent three-year 
period.  
 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
 
This study is structured in the following way; Section 2 introduces the pre-existing literature 
and summarizes the main findings around the topics. Section 3 presents the theoretical 
framework behind my study and outlines my five hypotheses. Section 4 describes the formation 
of the debt capital markets and corporate loan data sets, provides definitions for the variables 
used and thoroughly explains the methodologies used in analyzing the effect of private equity 
ownership on both a company’s credit metrics as well as on its investment and payout decisions 
following a bond issuance or a loan withdrawal. Section 5 summarizes the empirical results of 
the analyses and Section 6 discusses these results in detail with respect to my hypotheses and 
prior academic literature. Section 7 concludes the thesis and discusses possible topics for 
follow-up research in the future. 
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2. Literature review 
 
This section summarizes the four distinct ways in which this thesis contributes to prior academic 
literature. First, I discuss findings around the theme of operational performance of private 
equity-backed firms following their IPOs. Second, I address prior literature discussing a firm’s 
ownership structure and the cost of debt. Third, I discuss past research conducted on the 
reputational concerns private equity investors face. Finally, I present past studies conducted on 
wealth transfers through investment and payout policy decisions 
 
2.1 Post-IPO operational performance of private equity-backed firms  
 
The performance of private equity-backed companies after their initial public offering has been 
studied fairly extensively in academic literature over the last decade following the noticeable 
increase in private equity investment and activity in the market. Past research on the topic has 
largely centered on studying the stock market performance of the private equity-backed firms. 
Barry et al. (1990) was one of the first papers to study the operational performance of sponsor-
backed companies after their initial public offering and their research concludes that the market 
does seem to recognize the value private equity ownership, as they observed that IPOs with 
higher-quality venture capitalist involved were less underpriced compared to the non VC-
backed peer group.  
 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), Mian and Rosenfeld 
(1993) and Brav and Gompers (1997) were among the first ones to study the longer-term 
performance of reverse leveraged buyout6 (RLBO) firms after their IPO. Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) conclude that reverse LBOs generate significant improvements in 
profitability of the firms when compared to a sample of non-sponsor-backed companies, which 
largely stem from efficient cost-cutting programs and increased revenues. Degeorge and 
Zeckhauser (1993), on the other hand, find that the operating income divided by total assets of 
reverse LBO companies exceeds that of the reference group before the IPO, but the sponsor-
backed companies fall below their comparable non-sponsor-backed companies in the post-IPO 
period. Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) find significant abnormal returns in stock market 
                                                          
6 Reverese leveraged buyout (RLBO) refer to the process when former a leveraged buyout target company is 
listed again after the LBO investor’s holding period in the company.  
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performance of reverse LBO companies over a three-year period, which was largely the result 
of further takeover activity in the post-IPO period. Brav and Gompers (1997) also studied the 
underperformance of IPOs and their study implies that venture capital-backed companies 
outperform the non-VC-sponsored firms over a three-year period following their IPO. They 
suggest that the outperformance is partly a result of favorable long-term governance structures 
implemented by the venture capital owners to avoid tarnishing their reputation as a repeat 
sponsor on IPOs, as the investors of the venture capital funds may be the very same institutional 
investors taking part in the IPO. 
 
The second wave of post-IPO performance has been most notably covered by Cao and Lerner 
(2009), Cao (2011), Guo et al. (2011) and Krishnan et al. (2011), as the research focus shifted 
especially towards reverse leveraged buyouts. As private equity sponsors increasingly sourced 
for new portfolio companies from the public equity markets and acquired listed companies 
through leveraged buyouts, many of these companies were listed again after the holding period 
once the private equity owners chose to divest their ownership in the former LBO companies 
through an RLBO. Cao and Lerner (2009) studied the stock market performance of 526 RLBO 
companies up to three and five years after the initial public offering. The authors suggest that 
RLBOs outperform other IPOs of the same size and industry and find backing for the better 
performance from the better profitability of the companies. Further, Cao and Lerner (2009) 
conclude that the high leverage of the RLBO companies does not affect the post-IPO 
performance in a negative way, although their outperformance does revert when comparing the 
performance between three and five years since the IPO.  
 
In a later study, Cao (2011) finds that the post-IPO performance of RLBOs depends on the 
duration of the holding period, i.e. the time the private equity owner stays invested in the 
company, which again is partly a result of the IPO market conditions. The author finds evidence 
that when the market conditions are favorable, private equity owners tend to list the former 
LBO companies faster, whereas around unfavorable market conditions, PE investors hold the 
companies longer in their portfolios and refrain from listing the firms. Cao (2011) concludes 
that RLBOs with a short pre-IPO duration tend to experience poorer post-IPO performance 
relative to non-sponsor-backed peers, whereas RLBOs with a longer holding period perform in 
line with non-sponsor-backed peers, suggesting partly that the operational efficiencies created 
during the PE ownership persist longer post-IPO when the pre-IPO duration has been long.  
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Guo et al. (2011) study the post-IPO returns of buyout companies over time and find that, 
although LBO and RLBO companies have outperformed the non-sponsor-backed firms post-
IPO, the gains from operational performance have decreased when moving from the 1980s to 
the 2000s. However, they do still suggest that some portion of the outperformance stems from 
operational factors, e.g. CEO replacement, changes to cash flows and tax benefits, which are 
likely the result of governance structures implemented by the PE owners. Krishnan et al. (2011), 
on the other hand, study the post-IPO performance of venture capital-backed firms and find that 
companies backed by more reputable VC investors record a significantly better long-term post-
IPO performance than the companies owned by less reputable sponsors. Studying the period of 
up to three years after the initial public offering, the authors conclude that the more reputable 
investors are better in selecting the target companies as well as implement better governance in 
the portfolio companies.  
 
With the initial studies on sponsor-backed companies’ post-IPO performance focusing greatly 
on the North American private equity investors, Jelic et al. (2005), Chachine and Filatotchev 
(2008), Levis (2011) and Van Frederikslust and Van Der Geest (2011) were among the first to 
study the implications in the European market. Jelic et al. (2005) study the post-IPO 
performance of previous management buyout (MBO) companies in the UK and distinguish 
between whether a VC investor was involved in the buyout or not. The authors do not find 
venture capital-backing to be a significant determinant of the post-IPO performance, but similar 
to Krishnan et al. (2011) they find firms sponsored by highly reputable VC investors to perform 
better post-IPO than the companies backed by less reputable venture capitalists. Chachine and 
Filatochev (2008) also record a similar sponsor reputation-linked effect on post-IPO 
performance in the French IPO market, but observe that VC-sponsored IPO companies perform 
better relative to the non-sponsor-backed companies over the next full year since the initial 
public offering as well.  
 
Levis (2011) studies the post-IPO operational performance of UK-based PE-backed companies, 
and finds that PE-sponsored IPOs outperformed the non-sponsor-backed listings, which can 
partly be explained by larger sales, asset base and better profitability of the sponsor-backed 
companies post-IPO, when compared to the other IPO companies in the sample. Levis (2011), 
however, points out that PE-backed firms were clustered in only a few sectors, which can affect 
comparison with the general sample of companies. Van Frederikslust and Van Der Geest (2011) 
study the IPO market in the Netherlands and observe PE-backed companies to outperform the 
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non-sponsor-backed firms over the next three years after the IPO. The authors conclude that the 
higher sales growth rate of sponsor-backed companies positively affects the long-term post-
IPO performance. 
 
2.2 Ownership structure and cost of debt 
 
Pricing of debt instruments is a complex process that has intrigued researchers for decades, as 
it combines, among others, elements from debt issue-related factors, borrower fundamentals 
and the overall creditworthiness of the borrower. One key element of the process has been 
linked to the ownership structure of a borrower, as certain governance structures are better in 
mitigating agency costs and information asymmetries, aspects that are generally viewed credit 
negative by the lenders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) were among the first ones to document 
the exploitative behavior of managers and large shareholders at the bondholders’ expense, and 
conclude that certain organizational forms lead to self-benefit maximizing practices. Diamond 
(1984) on the other hand studied the mitigation of information asymmetries between private 
lenders, i.e. banks and public bondholders. The author concludes that due to their bilateral 
access to non-public information on the borrower, banks are more effective and more cost 
efficient in monitoring the creditworthiness of companies than public bondholders. Thus, with 
the greater availability of information, banks should perform better in mitigating information 
asymmetries and thereby price loans more accurately than the public market prices bonds.  
  
Since the 1980s, the research has shifted towards studying in greater depth how specific 
ownership and governance structures affect the cost of bond or loan financing. Inspired by the 
managerial self-interest side of agency costs, Barclay et al. (1993) study managerial block 
ownership and find that blockholders are able to secure several private benefits that might 
negatively affect the wealth of minority shareholders and debtholders. Thus, with an increasing 
agency risk, large managerial blockholdings are considered to have a negative effect on bond 
ratings and yields. Ortiz-Molina (2006) also studies the relationship of managerial ownership 
and a company’s borrowing costs and find similar results as Barclay et al. (1993), suggesting 
that a greater degree of managerial ownership is related to higher borrowing costs. The author 
also concludes that managerial stock option holdings affect the bond yields more than stock 
ownership does, with stock options providing a greater incentive for higher risk-taking. This 
possibly riskier governance of the firm is then adequately priced into the higher yield spreads 
that investors demand. A newer study by Aslan and Kumar (2012) examines the relationship of 
10 
 
 
 
a concentrated ownership and syndicated loan prices, with prior research focusing more on the 
public debt market. Although Diamond (1984) concluded that banks are better in mitigating 
information asymmetries, Aslan and Kumar (2012) still observe that a greater control 
concertation leads to higher loan spreads demanded by the banks, as a result of the governance 
structures that are viewed less friendly towards the lenders of the firm.  
 
Along with managerial ownership, the large involvement of institutional investors and their role 
in mitigating informational asymmetries has been carefully studied in past literature. Bhojraj 
and Sengupta (2003) study the relationship of institutional ownership and agency risk in the US 
and find conclusively that companies with a large institutional investor base have better 
governance mechanisms that mitigate informational asymmetries between the equity holders 
and bondholders. The authors conclude that the reduced agency risk results in higher credit 
ratings and lower yield spreads on the issuing company’s bonds, but similar to past literature 
on concentrated ownership (e.g. Barclay et al, 1993; Aslan and Kumar, 2012), the presence of 
institutional blockholders has negative effects on a firm’s credit quality and cost.  
 
Roberts and Yuan (2010) study the similar setting to Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) in the loan 
market and their research yields similar results. Roberts and Yuan (2010) find that also in the 
loan market, a higher degree of institutional ownership relates to lower financing costs through 
institutional owners’ active role in the firm’s corporate governance. Further, the authors 
validate that concentrated institutional ownership has adverse effects on the loan spreads of the 
firms, however, with the financing costs remaining lower than those of the companies with little 
or no institutional investors. Elyasiani et al. (2010) take a slightly different approach when 
studying the implications of institutional ownership and focus their research on distinguishing 
between the stability, i.e. long-term orientation vs. short-term orientation, of the institutional 
investors. Their study shows that institutional ownership, in general, has a positive effect on the 
cost of debt, but the observation is actually the result of a stable long-term orientation instead 
of the institutional ownership per se. Elyasiani et al. (2010) suggest further that a shortsighted 
less stable institutional ownership affects large companies’ borrowing costs more adversely 
than the costs of smaller companies. 
 
Anderson et al. (2003) examine the implications of founding family ownership in large listed 
companies on the perceived agency costs of debt financing. The authors find that, regardless of 
whether the family is a large blockholder or not, family ownership is negatively related to the 
11 
 
 
 
cost of debt financing. The observation of Anderson et al. (2003) suggests that family owners 
have a unique way of alleviating informational asymmetries, which stems from their assumedly 
longer-term investment horizon and that this commitment is rewarded with, on average, 32 
basis points lower cost of financing.  
 
Saunders and Steffen (2011), on the other hand, compare private and public ownership in the 
UK and its implications on the cost of loan financing. Their research concludes that due to 
greater information asymmetries and less bargaining power, private companies pay on average 
27 basis points higher loan spreads than similar listed companies would pay. Interestingly, 
Saunders and Steffen (2011) also find some evidence that after a private firm goes public, 
private equity involvement can have a negative implication on the cost of debt for the listing 
company. The effect observed by the authors is especially strong if the company was listed on 
a small stock exchange, but it does not fully disappear even if the company listed on a larger 
secondary marketplace. Borisova and Megginson (2011) study the effects of government 
ownership on the cost of debt and note that when governments divest their holdings, credit 
spreads increase. The authors explain the phenomenon with increasing uncertainty and lesser 
transparency of ownership as well as the material and assumed guarantees implied by the 
reputation of the government. 
 
Lin et al. (2011) take a novel approach in studying the relationship between ownership and cost 
of debt by analyzing the separation of control rights and cash flow rights in ownership. The 
authors claim that dual-class shares and pyramid ownership structures allow some minor 
shareholders to hold much of the ultimate control rights without having a significant stake in 
the company’s cash flows. Lin et al. (2011) find that the divergence between control and cash 
flow rights results in higher loan spreads and that the effect is especially strong in the case of 
family-owned companies, increased informational asymmetries and low credit ratings. While 
much of the research has directly focused on the cost of financing. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006) study the relationship between corporate governance and credit ratings and document 
that the governance structures that are viewed credit negative by banks and that the public debt 
capital markets affect the company’s creditworthiness negatively from the rating agencies’ 
point of view. Using an S&P corporate governance tool, the authors find common agent risk 
factors, such as significant blockholder ownership and CEO power, to affect the rating in a 
negative way. Further, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) conclude that companies with a favorable 
governance structure are nearly twice as likely to obtain an investment-grade rating and, given 
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the relationship between credit ratings and cost of financing, companies with transparent 
governance can obtain debt financing with significantly better terms.  
 
2.3 Reputational concerns of private equity firms 
 
The study on private equity has significantly increased with the increase in sponsor activity in 
the market. Their role as repeat investors has intrigued academic researchers and research on 
the reputation effect of private equity and venture capital firms has grown to become a specific 
area of private equity research. Diamond (1989) was among the first to report on the role of the 
reputation effect in mitigating informational asymmetries between equity holders and lenders. 
The author concludes that, although no significant difference is observed in the short-term, a 
positive borrower reputation decreases financing costs significantly in the long run by 
alleviating conflicts of interest. Diamond (1989) also suggest that if borrowers were not 
concerned about their reputation, borrowers have significant interests to invest in overly risky 
projects. Fang (2005) confirms the findings of Diamond (1989) by observing the relationship 
between positive reputation and cost of financing. Further, Fang (2005) concludes that once a 
good reputation is earned, the cost of losing the acquired reputation becomes large, which 
further incentivizes maintaining of the earned reputation on the market. 
 
Specifically on the sponsor ownership side of the research, Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
address the reputational concerns of venture capitalists in the IPO market and conclude that a 
good reputation among institutional investors is very for beneficial venture capital funds. 
Reputation is viewed crucial as PE investors are in the repeat business divesting their portfolio 
holdings and thus want to create trustworthy relationships with potential investors to ensure the 
sale of portfolio firm shares an IPO. Further, Megginson and Weiss (1991) suggest that the very 
same institutional investors also invest in venture capital firms themselves, which further 
highlights the importance of conducting operations in a reputable way.  
 
Gompers (1996) makes a similar observation to Megginson and Weiss (1991) around VC-
backed IPOs that venture capital companies avoid being associated with bad reputation to be 
able to secure a smooth IPO process for future divestments. Thus, VC investors’ behavior is 
dictated by their reputational concerns as they aim to govern the IPO process in a way that 
secures their reputable position going forward. Nahata (2008) analyzes the reputation effect 
around IPOs further by studying the different reputational characteristics of VC companies, 
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such as age, cumulative market capitalization of IPOs and number of investment rounds. The 
author finds that cumulative market capitalization of past IPOs is the primary determinant of 
venture capital reputation, as VC funds with the highest cumulative market capitalization of 
past IPOs perform best in terms of successfully listing their subsequent portfolio companies in 
the future through a better market access when compared to less reputable VC companies. Thus, 
the finding of Nahata (2008) highlights the importance of VC funds retaining their favorable 
reputation to secure their market position. Using the same measure of VC reputation, Krishnan 
et al. (2011) find that more reputable venture capital investors are more involved in the post-
IPO governance of the portfolio companies, which in turn leads to a positive long-term 
operational performance.  
 
The second wave of private equity research on reputational concerns has revolved around 
studying the relationship between PE investors and lenders. Brav and Gompers (1997) conclude 
in their VC-backed IPO performance study that reputable venture capital firms have better 
relationships with top-tier investment and commercial banks, giving the first implications on 
the importance of venture capitalist reputation on debt market access. Ivanshina and Kovner 
(2011) further study the importance of banking relationships to private equity firms and note 
that PE investors with stronger bank relationships received LBO financing with significantly 
better loan terms, when comparing to PE investors with less established bank relationships. 
Thus, as solid relationships ensure private equity investors receive loan financing at a lower 
cost, PE firms are cautious about their reputation towards the lenders to sustain the favorable 
cost of financing for all future borrowing needs.  
 
Demiroglu and James (2010) study the LBO financing market and observe several implications 
of a positive PE investor reputation. The authors suggest that a favorable reputation leads to 
better financing terms in the form of lower loan spreads and longer maturities offered to the 
more reputable PE firms. Further, although reputable PE investors generally tend to borrow 
more when loan financing is relatively cheap, the authors conclude that the observed low levels 
of loan spreads also result from a positive reputation significantly reducing agency costs of 
LBO lending. 
  
Tyková and Borell (2012) study the bankruptcy risks of private equity-backed companies and 
find that PE firms generally invest in companies with better-than-average financial stability and 
that the portfolio companies’ distress risk actually increases over the course of the PE holding 
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period. The authors, however, conclude that the risk does not increase above the distress risk of 
a comparable peer group and thus private equity ownership is not viewed to cause an increased 
risk of bankruptcy. Further, Tyková and Borell (2012) suggest that more reputable private 
equity firms are able to lower their portfolio companies’ distress risk even more and thus, as a 
result of their reputation, they are able to secure financing with lower costs than other PE-
backed companies or non-sponsor-backed firms.  
 
In a similar study, Hotchkiss et al. (2014) analyze the default rates of PE-backed companies 
and have somewhat opposing results. The authors find that private equity-backed companies 
are actually more likely to default compared to non-PE-backed companies as a result of PE 
portfolio firms holding more debt on their balance sheets. However, Hotchkiss et al. (2014) 
suggest that when studying the group of companies with especially high leverage ratios, PE-
backed companies are less likely to default than non-PE-owned companies in their peer group. 
This finding implies that private equity owners are more experience in mitigating the distress 
risk arising from significantly high leverage levels. The authors conclude that due to the proper 
mitigation of distress risk, private equity-backed companies are able to lever their balance 
sheets more relative to non-PE-backed firms without paying significantly higher spreads on 
their loan. 
 
Cain et al. (2012) study the implications of private equity reputation by analyzing bid contract 
breaches by PE investors during the financial crisis 2007-2008. The authors find that during the 
financial crisis, many PE investors were forced to choose between whether to terminate or 
honor unprofitable contracts. As terminating financial contracts resulted in a significant 
reputational loss and adverse effects on future penalty clauses in their contracts, private equity 
firms were willing to suffer losses resulting from unprofitable contracts in the magnitude of 5-
9% of their total fund value – however, after this threshold, PE companies were rather willing 
to take the reputational loss. Thus, Cain et al. (2012) conclude that reputation has significant 
economic value for private equity firms and they rather incur significant losses to protect their 
long-term reputation than be viewed negatively by the market.  
 
2.4 Wealth transfers through investment and payout decisions 
 
Investment and payout decisions are common events during a firm’s financial year, but the 
question of whether the equity holders of a firm use investments, dividends and share 
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repurchases as an exploitative way to transfer wealth from bondholders has been raised by 
academic literature. On the investments side, Myers (1977) was the first to study the topic 
through the concept of underinvestment. The author argues that, rather than investing too much 
in too risky projects, investing too little may prove to negative affect debtholder value. Myers 
(1977) concludes that underinvestment around debt issues may be a sign of the firm 
intentionally rejecting net present value positive investments and pay out overly excessive 
dividends, thus transferring bondholder wealth to the shareholders of the company. On the 
contrary, Titman et al. (2004) and Cooper et al. (2008) find that abnormal capital expenditure 
and tangible asset growth, respectively, negatively affect a firm’s futures stock returns due to 
managerial empire building. In the context of the observation’s possible effects on the 
bondholders of a firm, Huang et al. (2016) suggest that the implication is twofold from the 
debtholders point of view. Bondholders benefit from the increase in cash flow and asset base if 
excessive investment is not funded with additional debt but, on the other hand, are worse off if 
additional leverage is used to finance the overinvestment.  
 
On the payout policy side of past literature, Kalay (1982) recognizes the wealth transfer 
opportunities around new bond issues and underinvestment and studies the covenants set on 
dividend payments by bondholders to prevent limit wealth transfer possibilities. The author 
finds that bondholders do structure dividend payout covenants rationally, but observes that 
shareholders do not pay themselves the maximum amount they would be allowed to. Thus, 
Kalay (1982) concludes that under the dividend payout covenants, no support for wealth 
transfer is observed.  
 
Maxwell ant Stephens (2003) study the wealth transfer effect from bondholders to equity 
holders around share repurchase announcements. The authors find that a shareholder gain 
around repurchases is not solely a wealth transfer from bondholders, but rather a function of 
wealth transfer effect and signaling effect and the dominating factor depends on whether 
investors view the signal as positive or negative. In the context of sponsor-ownership, Jain et 
al. (2009) study the payout decisions of companies after their initial public offering. The authors 
find that if the company was VC-backed on its IPO, the company is much more likely to prefer 
share repurchases to dividends as its payout method. When considering for the findings of 
Kalay (1982) and Maxwell and Stephens (2003), the finding of Jain et al. (2009) proves to be 
rather interesting, as venture capital-backed companies would implicitly prefer the payout 
method that partially transfers wealth form the bondholders.  
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A fairly recent study by Harford and Kolasinski (2014) analyzes whether private equity 
investors benefit from wealth transfers from debtholders. First, the authors find no evidence 
that the investment policy of PE-backed firms would differ from that of non-PE-sponsored 
companies, suggesting that excessive investment under private equity ownership is an unlikely 
way of transferring wealth. Second, Harford and Kolasinski (2014) observe that any payout 
(dividends and share repurchases) made to the private equity-owner do not result to an increased 
distress risk in the future. Thus, the authors also conclude that PE owners do not transfer wealth 
through excessive payout policies.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
As the basis of my study, I have formulated five testable hypotheses (H1-H5). The first two 
hypotheses (Wealth Expropriation and Reputation Acquisition) are somewhat competing in 
nature and focus on explaining the effects of private equity ownership in the credit metrics of 
companies issuing bonds or loans. The latter three hypotheses (Overinvestment, Excessive 
Dividend and Buyback Exit) study the first two hypotheses further by aiming to explain the use 
of proceeds from the bond issuance or loan withdrawal through investment and payout policies 
of the issuing company. This section discusses the five hypotheses in greater detail. 
 
My first two hypotheses aim to discuss the somewhat conflicting relationship between the 
private equity investors and the other stakeholders of their portfolio companies. Private equity 
firms’ main target is to maximize the value of their equity holding during their ownership period 
thus providing a justified return for their own investors7. This may lead to the PE owners acting 
only in their own interest and exploiting other stakeholders of the portfolio company. Thereby, 
with usually fairly levered balance sheets of the portfolio companies, private equity owners not 
only resort to creating value through company development, but also aim to create value 
through wealth transfers from bondholders to the equity holders. Exploitative behavior can take 
place in many forms, from making overly risky investments to having an excessive dividend 
payout policy. Thereby, with private equity owners having the sole target of maximizing the 
value of a portfolio company’s equity, I hypothesize the following; 
                                                          
7 Private equity investments are generally structured in the form of limited partnerships, where the PE firm is the 
general partner (GP) and their own investors, i.e. limited partners or LPs, commonly consist of other institutional 
investors, such as pension funds or mutual funds, along with high net worth individuals (Kaplan and Schoar, 
2005). 
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H1 (Wealth Expropriation Hypothesis) – Private equity owners aim to maximize the value of 
their shareholding by transferring wealth from bondholders, thus increasing the borrowing costs 
of their portfolio companies.  
 
On the contrary, private equity firms usually have investments in several companies at the same 
time and they thus are in the repeat business of raising debt for their portfolio companies. 
Should bond investors observe that a PE firm exploits the bondholders of one of its portfolio 
companies, investors would be likely to expect similar practices to extend to all of the portfolio 
companies of the given private equity owner, resulting in tighter borrowing conditions and more 
expensive debt. Thus, private equity firms aim to establish a reputation of a reliable borrower 
to secure inexpensive debt financing not only for the one portfolio company in question, but 
also for all future debt raisings of current and prospective portfolio firms. To secure and 
maintain the desired borrower reputation, private equity owners may implement governance 
policies in their portfolio companies that do not exploit lenders. Further, achieving low 
financing costs in the long run can be seen to benefit the private equity funds through the present 
value of savings achieved through the lower interest rates. Given the PE funds’ incentive to 
maintain a favorable reputation, I expect to find the following; 
 
H2 (Reputation Acquisition Hypothesis) – Private equity firms are repeat borrowers and highly 
concerned about their reputation in the market. To secure their market reputation, firms 
implement bondholder-friendly policies that lower the cost of debt for their portfolio 
companies.  
 
To study the implicitly exploitative private equity ownership in greater detail, I test three further 
hypotheses that build on the Wealth Expropriation Hypothesis (H1). These three hypotheses 
aim to give further understanding on the private equity owners’ great power in dictating the use 
of the proceeds from the bond issue or loan withdrawal. When a portfolio company issues debt 
and receives a large sum of financing, private equity owners as large shareholders have the 
opportunity to establish investment policies that maximize their own benefit and thus can invest 
the funds in riskier projects when comparing to the non-PE-backed companies (Diamond, 
1989). With the incentive to overinvest, I hypothesize the following; 
 
H3 (Overinvestment Hypothesis) – Private equity firms as large shareholders have incentive to 
invest more aggressively after the bond issuance or loan withdrawal.  
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Further, along with having ambitious investment programs, the Private Equity owners may be 
tempted to use the proceeds from the debt issuance towards their own benefit by simply paying 
excessive dividends relative to their non-PE peers following the large capital inflow. Given the 
exploitative opportunity to pay out debt proceeds as additional dividends back to the PE fund, 
I expect to observe the following; 
 
H4 (Excessive Dividend Hypothesis) – Private equity firms as large shareholders are likely to 
pay excessive dividends after the bond issuance or loan withdrawal. 
 
Finally, although private equity investors tend to stay invested in a portfolio company even after 
selling a portion of their holding in the IPO, they do plan to exit their holding permanently in 
the medium term, usually within the next 5 years (Fürth and Rauch, 2015). Thereby, as share 
repurchases are one of the common exit strategies for private equity investors (Talmor and 
Vasvari, 2011), PE-backed companies are more likely to buy back their shares following a large 
influx of capital through the bond issuance or loan withdrawal.  
 
H5 (Buyback Exit Hypothesis) – Private equity firms have incentive to permanently exit the 
portfolio company after an IPO and sponsor portfolio companies are thus likely to repurchase 
shares after the bond issuance or loan withdrawal. 
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4. Data and methodologies 
 
To test the presented hypotheses, I gather a Pan-European sample of bonds issued by companies 
that went public through an IPO between January 1, 1980 and June 30, 2014. I then run several 
multivariate analyses studying the post-IPO relationship between private equity sponsorship 
and a firm’s credit metrics, investment decisions and payout policy around bond issuances and 
loan withdrawals. This section thoroughly explains the formulation of the final data sets, 
describes the different multivariate models and defines the variables used in the analysis.  
 
4.1 Sample formation and distribution 
 
I use the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Global New Issues database to identify all European 
companies that went public during the period between January 1, 1980 and June 30, 2014. After 
excluding all issuances of Depository Receipts, Certificates, Loan Stocks, Preference Shares 
and other forms of non-common stock, the number of European IPOs in the database over the 
nearly 35-year period totals to 6,480, with a significant majority of the observations occurring 
after 1993. For simplicity, I limit the analysis to 17 European countries with the most 
observations over the period (Figure 1), while the sample still accounts for 97% of the 
observations in the initial sample. Of the 6,256 final IPOs, 636 were backed by a private equity 
or venture capital sponsor. Contrary to Huang et al. (2016), I do not exclude the financial sector 
issuers (SIC codes 6000-6799) from the sample of IPO companies, but do include a dummy 
variable (FINANCIAL_DUMt) to distinguish the effects arising from the somewhat dissimilar 
firm characteristics.  
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Figure 1. Number of European companies going public during the sampling period by country 
 
This figure presents the number of companies in the final IPO sample by country. The final IPO sample includes all 6,256 
companies that went public during the period of January 1, 1980 and June 30, 2014 originating from the 17 European companies 
with the most observations during the selected period. 
 
With the fully formulated IPO sample, I again use the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Global 
New Issues database to obtain my final debt capital markets sample. Initially, I am interested 
in all bond issues for European listed companies, or their European finance subsidiaries that 
issued debt to the European market during the period of January 1, 1981 and June 30, 2015 and 
arrive at 26,978 bonds that can be linked to a European publicly listed entity. I then exclude all 
variable rate, floating rate, putable, perpetual, and convertible bonds from the sample, along 
with all other debt-like products that differ from a traditional fixed rate bond. Further, I exclude 
all observations with a missing maturity, yield to maturity or proceeds amount to allow for a 
sufficient amount of issue-specific data for the analysis. I then manually match the bonds in the 
formulated debt capital markets sample with the companies in my IPO sample to determine the 
bonds that were issued by companies that went public through an IPO during the desired time 
period. A total of 3,933 bonds can be linked with 410 companies in the IPO sample.  
 
Further, bond issues that lack company-specific fundamental data required for variable 
construction are excluded and credit rating data limitations force me to only include bonds 
issued after August 1993. Continuing to formulate the final sample, the bond issues are limited 
with a one-year minimum requirement since the IPO to ensure all bond offerings are matched 
with reliable company-specific lagged values from the year before the bond issue. Lastly, I only 
consider issues that fall between the first twelve years8 since a company’s IPO and exclude any 
offerings dated after the first twelve years since the IPO. The final debt capital markets sample 
                                                          
8 Huang et al. (2016) limit the bonds to a maximum on 10 years since the IPO, but to allow for a comparably-sized 
sample, I extend my sample to twelve with two additional years.  
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
U
n
it
ed
K
in
g
d
o
m
F
ra
n
ce
G
er
m
an
y
P
o
la
n
d
It
al
y
N
o
rw
ay
S
w
ed
en
G
re
ec
e
T
u
rk
ey
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
B
el
g
iu
m
S
p
ai
n
D
en
m
ar
k
F
in
la
n
d
A
u
st
ri
a
P
o
rt
u
g
al
#
 o
f 
IP
O
s
21 
 
 
 
consists of 1,249 bond issues by 207 individual companies. Company and issue specific lagged 
values are obtained from Thomson ONE and Datastream for each of the observations.  
 
To also address the fairly bank-centered financing space of Europe, I also obtain data of 28,740 
corporate loan issues by all European public companies and their European finance subsidiaries 
between January 1, 1981 and June 30, 2015. Similar to the debt capital markets sample, I 
exclude all lease, real estate, guarantee, and export credit and trade finance products from the 
sample as well as all other observations that differ from a traditional term loan or revolving 
credit facility for general corporate purposes. Further, all observations with no maturity, 
maximum spread or proceeds amount are excluded from the sample. As with the bond issues, 
the remaining 3,441 individual loan issues are manually matched with companies in the IPO 
sample. A total of 1,093 loans can be linked with companies in the final IPO sample. When 
formulating the final corporate loan sample, I also remove all observations with no company 
and issue-specific lagged values and limit the observations to a minimum of 1 year and a 
maximum of 12 years since the IPO. The abovementioned requirements force me to exclude all 
loan observations before May 1998 and I end up with 453 loan issues by 102 companies in the 
final corporate loan sample. 
 
To better distinguish the effect of private equity ownership on the company’s post-IPO 
governance, both the debt capital market sample and the corporate loan sample are divided into 
the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period and the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period. 
The [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample consists of bond issues dating to a maximum of six years since the 
initial public offering date, by which the private involvement has usually decreased.9 On the 
contrary, the [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample features all the bonds issued by the end of the 12th year 
since the firm’s IPO. Conceptually, as private equity involvement in a portfolio company tends 
to diminish with time passing since the IPO, findings from the narrower sampling period are 
considered more meaningful. Further, as the samples feature many companies with several 
bond and loan issues over the sampling period, with Utilities and Financial sector companies 
being the most frequent issuers, clustering at the company level needs to be addressed in the 
analysis.  
 
 
                                                          
9 Although sponsors usually sell a great portion of their holding in the IPO, Fürth and Rauch (2015) find that 
Private Equity funds stay invested in the firms with a smaller stake for on average 2.8 years after the IPO. 
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4.2 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
4.2.1 Variable definitions 
 
To test my two hypotheses on the effects of private equity ownership on a portfolio company’s 
credit quality, I study the two main credit metrics available for the bond issues, i.e. credit ratings 
and yield spread. Credit rating model for S&P (Moody’s) is presented in Section 4.3.1, with 
S&P_RATINGt (MOODY’S_RATINGt) as the dependent variable. Section 4.3.2 covers the yield 
spread and loan spread model with YIELD_SPREADt and LOAN_SPREADt, respectively, as 
dependent variables.  
 
Similar to Huang et al. (2016), I introduce a number of different dependent variables to test my 
further three hypotheses on excessive investment and payout policies. For the investment policy 
models presented in Section 4.4.1, I use three alternative investment measures as the dependent 
variable (CAPEX/TANGt,t+2, CAPEX/ATt,t+2 and (CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2)10. Similarly, for the 
dividend policy models discussed in Section 4.4.2, I analyze the model with four different 
dependent variables (DIV_PAYER_DUMt,t+2, DIV_PAYOUTt,t+2, DIV_YIELDt,t+2 and 
DIV/ASSETSt,t+2). Finally, for the share repurchase models presented in Section 4.4.3, I analyze 
the model with three dependent variables (SHARE_REPUR_DUMt,t+2, SHARE_REPURt,t+2 and 
SHARE_REPUR/ASSETSt,t+2), all of which derive their logic from the dividend policy model 
variables. 
 
To control for the macro environment and for the industry, company and issue-specific factors, 
I introduce a number of independent variables presented and described in Table 1. An especial 
interest throughout the analysis is put on the private equity-backed IPO dummy variable 
(PE_DUMt), as the coefficient of this variable will help explain the effect of private equity 
ownership on the credit rating of a portfolio company’s bond (loan), bond yield (loan spread) 
and the use of bond (loan) proceeds in investments, dividend payouts and share buybacks post-
IPO. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 ATt,t+2 used in the three alternative investment measures refers to the total asset of the company at the 
beginning of the financial year.  
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Table 1. Definitions of dependent and independent variables 
 
This table presents and defines the dependent and independent variables used in the multivariate analyses of this thesis and 
cites the main source of the variable itself or its inputs. Any references to the to the bond issue date (year) refer to the loan 
announcement date (year) in the context of the European corporate loan sample, if applicable. All monetary variables in the 
sample are reported in USD.  
Variable Definition Source 
 Panel A: Dependent Variables 
 
S&P_RATINGt S&P credit rating of the bond/loan taking values between 1 and 19, 
where 1 equals to CCC- and 19 to AAA. 
SDC Platinum 
MOODY’S_RATINGt Moody’s credit rating of the bond/loan taking values between 1 and 
19, where 1 equals to Caa3 and 19 to Aaa. 
SDC Platinum 
YIELD_SPREADt Difference of a bond’s basis point yield-to-maturity and yield on a 
similar maturity sovereign bond11 of the country where the issuing 
firm is listed. 
SDC Platinum  
Datastream 
LOAN_SPREADt Difference of a loan’s maximum basis point spread and its reference 
rate (EURIBOR or LIBOR) on the loan announcement date. 
SDC Platinum  
Datastream 
CAPEX/TANGt,t+2 Three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2) capital expenditure divided by the net tangible assets 
at the beginning of the bond issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
CAPEX/ATt,t+2 Three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2) capital expenditure divided by the total assets at the 
beginning of the bond issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
(CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2 Three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2) of the sum of capital expenditure and R&D 
investments divided by the total assets at the beginning of the bond 
issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
DIV_PAYER_DUMt,t+2 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the issuer has paid a dividend 
in at least one of the three years (bond issue year t and two preceding 
financial years t+1, t+2) and 0 otherwise. 
Thomson ONE 
DIV_PAYOUTt,t+2 Three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2) of common dividend divided by end-of-year income 
before extraordinary items. 
Thomson ONE 
DIV_YIELDt,t+2 Three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2) of dividend per share divided by end-of-year share 
price in a given year. 
Thomson ONE 
DIV/ASSETSt,t+2 Three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2) of common dividend divided by the total assets at 
the beginning of the bond issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
SHARE_REPUR_ DUMt,t+2 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the issuer has bought back 
shares in at least one of the three years (bond issue year t and two 
preceding financial years t+1, t+2) and 0 otherwise. 
Thomson ONE 
SHARE_REPURt,t+2 Three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2) of share repurchases divided by end-of-year income 
before extraordinary items. 
Thomson ONE 
SHARE_REPUR/ASSETSt,t+2 Three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2) of share repurchases divided by the total assets at the 
beginning of the bond issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
 
Panel B: Independent Variables 
 
PE_DUMt Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the bond/loan issuer’s IPO 
was backed by a private equity or venture capital sponsor and 0 
otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
                                                          
11 Similar maturities of sovereign bonds are defined in the following way: 1-yr treasury if MATURITYt ≤ 1.5 yrs., 
2-yr treasury if 1.5 yrs. < MATURITYt ≤ 2.5 yrs., 3-yr treasury if 2.5 yrs. < MATURITYt ≤ 4.0 yrs., 5-yr treasury if 
4.0 yrs. < MATURITYt ≤ 6.0 yrs., 7-yr treasury if 6.0 yrs. < MATURITYt ≤ 8.5 yrs., 10-yr treasury if 8.5 yrs. < 
MATURITYt ≤ 20.0 yrs. and 30-yr treasury if 20 yrs. < MATURITYt, where MATURITYt is the maturity of the bond 
in years.  
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Variable Definition Source 
 Panel B: Independent Variables (continuing) 
 
DEFAULT_SPREADt Basis point yield difference of European Moody’s rated Baa and Aaa 
bonds of a similar maturity. 
Datastream 
PROCEEDSt Gross proceeds (in billions) from the bond/loan issue.  SDC Platinum 
MATURITYt Number of years between the bond’s (loan’s) final maturity date and 
issue (announcement) date. 
SDC Platinum 
EXTENDABLE_DUMt Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the loan’s final maturity 
date is extendable by additional time and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
REVOLVER_DUMt Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the loan is a revolving 
credit facility and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
SUBORD_DUMt Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the bond/loan is 
subordinated and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
FIRST_BOND_DUMt  Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the bond is the first bond 
issued by the company and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
FIRST_LOAN_DUMt Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the loan is the first loans 
issued by the company and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
TOTAL_BONDSt Number of bonds issued by the firm prior to the bond issue date. 
Includes the current one and any similar issuances before the IPO. 
SDC Platinum 
TOTAL_LOANSt Number of loans issued by the firm prior to the loan announcement 
date. Includes the current one and any similar issuances before the 
IPO. 
SDC Platinum 
M_CAPt-1 Market value of equity of the issuer in billions at the end of the full 
financial before the bond issue year.  
Thomson ONE 
AGEt Number of years between the bond’s issue date and the company’s 
founding date.  
SDC Platinum  
Thomson ONE 
ROAt-1 Net income of the issuer at divided by the total assets at the end of 
the full financial before the bond issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
LOSS_DUMt-1 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company’s net income was 
negative during the full financial year before the bond issue and 0 
otherwise. 
Thomson ONE 
ICR0,t-1 Interest coverage ratio variable calculated by dividing operating 
income with total interest expense for the full financial before the 
bond issue year, taking values by the ICR grid. 
Thomson ONE 
ICR5,t-1 Interest coverage ratio variable taking values by the ICR grid. Thomson ONE 
ICR10,t-1 Interest coverage ratio variable taking values by the ICR grid. Thomson ONE 
ICR20,t-1 Interest coverage ratio variable taking values by the ICR grid. Thomson ONE 
LEVERAGEt-1 Book value of total debt divided by total assets at the end of the full 
financial before the bond issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
MARKET_TO_BOOKt-1 Sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by 
total assets at the end of the full financial before the bond issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
TANGIBILITYt-1 Net property, plant & equipment in the beginning of the bond issue 
year divided by the opening value of total assets. 
Thomson ONE 
UTILITY_DUMt Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the issuing company is a 
regulated Utility, Transport or Communications firm (SIC codes 
4000-4949) and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
FINANCIAL_DUMt Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the issuing company is a 
Financial entity (SIC codes 6000-6799) and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
SOVEREIGN_RATINGt S&P (Moody’s) sovereign credit rating of the country where the 
issuing firm is listed taking values between 1 and 19, where 1 equals 
to CCC- (Caa3) and 19 to AAA (Aaa). 
SDC Platinum 
NET_DEBTt Defined as the change in the book value of debt of the issuing firm 
over the bond issue year divided by the opening value of total assets.  
Thomson ONE 
SUBSIDIARY_DUMt Dummy variable taking the value 1 when the bond/loan issuing 
entity is a finance subsidiary of the parent and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
RETURNt Difference of the buy-and-hold return of the bond issuer’s stock and 
the buy-and-hold return of a pan-European market index during a 1-
year period before the bond issue date. 
Thomson ONE 
CAPEX/TANGt-1 Capital expenditure divided by the net tangible assets during the full 
financial year before the bond issue. 
Thomson ONE 
CAPEX/ATt-1 Capital expenditure divided by the total assets during the full 
financial year before the bond issue. 
Thomson ONE 
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Variable Definition Source 
 Panel B: Independent Variables (continuing) 
 
(CAPEX+RD)/ATt-1 Sum of capital expenditure and R&D investments divided by the 
total assets during the full financial year before the bond issue. 
Thomson ONE 
DIV_PAYER_DUMt-1 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company paid a dividend 
during the full financial year before the bond issue and 0 otherwise. 
Thomson ONE 
DIV_PAYOUTt-1 Common dividend during the full financial year before the bond 
issue divided by end-of-year income before extraordinary items. 
Thomson ONE 
DIV_YIELDt-1 Dividend per share during the full financial year before the bond 
issue divided by end-of-year share price. 
Thomson ONE 
DIV/ASSETSt-1 Common dividend during the full financial year divided by the total 
assets at the beginning of the bond issue year. 
Thomson ONE 
SHARE_REPUR_ DUMt-1 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company repurchased 
shares during the full financial year before the bond issue and 0 
otherwise. 
Thomson ONE 
SHARE_REPURt-1 Share repurchases during the full financial year before the bond 
issue divided by end-of-year income before extraordinary items. 
Thomson ONE 
SHARE_REPUR/ASSETSt-1 Share repurchases during the full financial year before the bond 
issue divided by the total assets at the beginning of the bond issue 
year. 
Thomson ONE 
BOND_PEDIOD_DUM2001,2007 
(LOAN_PEDIOD_DUM2001,2007) 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond was issued (loan was 
announced) between 2001-2007 and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
BOND_PEDIOD_DUM2008,2012 
(LOAN_PEDIOD_DUM2008,2012) 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond was issued (loan was 
announced) between 2008-2012 and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
BOND_PEDIOD_DUM2013,2015 
(LOAN_PEDIOD_DUM2013,2015) 
Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond was issued (loan was 
announced) between 2013-2015 and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
IPO_PERIOD_DUM1999-2000 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if issuer’s IPO occurred between 
1999-2000 and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
IPO_PERIOD_DUM2001-2007 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if issuer’s IPO occurred between 
2001-2007 and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
IPO_PERIOD_DUM2008-2012 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if issuer’s IPO occurred between 
2008-2012 and 0 otherwise 
SDC Platinum 
IPO_PERIOD_DUM2013-2014 Dummy variable taking the value 1 if issuer’s IPO occurred between 
2013-2014 and 0 otherwise 
SDC Platinum 
COUNTRY_DUMMIESt Dummy variables for each European country in the sample (except 
for the United Kingdom) taking the value 1 if issuer is incorporated 
in that given country and 0 otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Thomson ONE 
 
Control variables were chosen to reflect prior literature (e.g. Harford and Kolasinski, 2014; 
Huang et al., 2016) with two additional variables that better account for the analysis of the 
corporate loan sample (i.e. EXTENDABLE_DUMt and REVOLVER_DUMt). Further, to better 
account for the country-specific differences in Europe, I introduce the SOVEREIGN_RATINGt 
variable, which controls for the country specific variation in credit ratings12. In line with Huang 
et al. (2016), to account for the nonlinear effect of the interest coverage ratio (ICR) on both 
credit ratings and yield and loan spreads, I introduce the interest coverage ratio variables as first 
introduced by Ashbaugh-Skeife et al. (2006). ICRt-1 is calculated by dividing the operating 
income with the total interest expense of the issuer for the full financial before the bond issue 
year and the -1 variables (ICR0,t-1, ICR5,t-1, ICR10,t-1 and ICR20,t-1) take values according to the 
                                                          
12 Country-specific variation is also controlled in the yield and loan spread analysis by using sovereign bond 
yields as the benchmark for yield spreads and EURIBOR and LIBOR rates as the benchmark for loan spreads. 
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ICR grid below. All of the four variables get the value 0 if ICRt-1 is negative and the value 100 
if ICRt-1 is greater than 100.  
 
 
4.2.2 Descriptive statistics for [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period 
 
For brevity, descriptive statistics for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period for both the debt 
capital markets and corporate debt data sets are reported in Table 13 in Appendix A. By looking 
at the descriptive statistics for the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period presented in Table 
2 (Panel A), I note that the mean and median credit ratings of PE-sponsored firms for both S&P 
and Moody’s are observably lower than the ratings of the non-PE-backed companies. A similar 
observation holds in the case of yield and loan spreads, as the mean and median for both is 
noticeably higher for PE-backed companies when compared to the non-PE-backed firms of the 
sample. Other mentionable observations from the means and medians of the sample (Panel B) 
include that the sponsor-backed firms are more levered and smaller in terms of market 
capitalization when compared to the non-PE-backed companies. Further, sponsor-backed 
companies issue larger debt instruments, however, with maturities similar maturities, and are 
observably younger than their non-sponsor-backed peer companies are. Also, the stock returns 
of PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms are in the same range over a one-year period before the 
bond issue date.  
 
When solely comparing the PE-backed firms in the debt capital markets sample and corporate 
loan sample, I find that the raised loan amounts are larger than the financing raised through 
bonds and maturities on withdrawn loans are shorter than on issued bonds, with companies 
taking loan financing also being slightly older than the firms issuing bonds are. Additionally, 
the PE-backed firms in the corporate loan sample are larger than the firms in the debt capital 
markets sample in terms of market capitalization and PE-backed companies withdrawing loans 
are more likely to make a loss than the bond issuing PE-backed firms are. 
 
 
 
ICR Grid ICR 0,t-1 ICR 5,t-1 ICR 10,t-1 ICR 20,t-1
0 ≤ ICR t-1 < 5 ICR t-1 0 0 0
0 ≤ ICR t-1 < 5 5 ICR t-1 - 5 0 0
0 ≤ ICR t-1 < 5 5 5 ICR t-1 - 10 0
0 ≤ ICR t-1 < 5 5 5 10 ICR t-1 - 20
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for post-IPO bond issuances and loan withdrawals – [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
 
This table presents the sample sizes, medians and means of both the dependent variables (Panel A) and independent variables 
(Panel B) used in this study. The table shows statistics for both the final debt capital markets sample and the final corporate 
loan sample in the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period that cover all bonds and loans issued between immediately after 
and a maximum of 6 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. For both samples, the statistics are reported separately 
for the PE-backed IPOs (i.e. PE_DUMt taking the value 1) and for all the IPOs in a given sample (i.e. PE_DUMt taking either 
the value 0 or 1). PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond issuer was backed by a private 
equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. For brevity, statistics for the 
bond period dummy variables (BOND_PERIOD_DUMi), loan period dummy variables (LOAN_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period 
dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the 
table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
Sample Debt Capital Markets [IPO+0, IPO+6] Corporate Loan [IPO+0, IPO+6]
Subsample PE-Backed IPOs All IPOs PE-Backed IPOs All IPOs
n 61 486 46 192
Dependent Variables Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
S&P_RATING t 8.000 9.830 14.000 13.429 8.000 8.295 11.000 10.672
MOODY’S_RATING t 7.000 8.811 15.000 14.145 8.000 7.750 11.000 10.724
YIELD_SPREAD t 317.600 272.621 70.875 101.318
LOAN_SPREAD t 100.000 151.196 85.000 125.348
CAPEX/TANG t,t+2 0.210 38.720 11.076 53.631 -9.029 122.931 12.969 144.013
CAPEX/AT t,t+2 3.858 4.979 4.151 5.266 5.493 6.210 6.184 7.538
(CAPEX+RD)/AT t,t+2 4.603 5.444 4.492 5.611 5.831 6.729 6.508 8.008
DIV_PAYER_DUM t,t+2 1.000 0.885 1.000 0.712 1.000 0.957 1.000 0.943
DIV_PAYOUT t,t+2 34.339 40.464 27.826 39.765 34.366 30.509 34.953 117.484
DIV_YIELD t,t+2 1.904 2.459 3.008 4.319 2.066 3.982 2.674 3.656
DIV/ASSETS t,t+2 1.362 1.853 0.552 1.340 2.748 2.515 1.644 2.797
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t,t+2 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.391 0.000 0.297
SHARE_REPUR t,t+2 0.000 10.946 0.000 4.789 0.000 4.365 0.000 4.627
SHARE_REPUR/ASSETS t,t+2 0.000 0.730 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.228 0.000 0.295
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Table 2. (Continuing) 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B
Sample Debt Capital Markets [IPO+0, IPO+6] Corporate Loan [IPO+0, IPO+6]
Subsample PE-Backed IPOs All IPOs PE-Backed IPOs All IPOs
n 61 486 46 192
Independent Variables Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
PE_DUM t 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.126 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.240
DEFAULT_SPREAD t 95.400 100.389 101.600 123.146
PROCEEDS t 0.503 1.381 0.330 0.788 0.702 0.994 0.691 1.641
MATURITY t 7.058 9.324 7.064 8.708 5.003 4.300 4.638 3.781
EXTENDABLE_DUM t 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.120
REVOLVER_DUM t 0.000 0.435 1.000 0.521
SUBORD_DUM t 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016
FIRST_BOND_DUM t 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.204
FIRST_LOAN_DUM t 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.234
TOTAL_BONDS t 2.000 2.951 5.000 17.951
TOTAL_LOANS t 4.500 9.261 3.000 7.740
M_CAP t-1 3.778 4.177 9.507 30.384 5.219 4.611 6.224 21.696
AGE t 8.485 21.778 26.074 37.256 9.723 34.032 10.014 23.043
ROA t-1 0.023 0.023 0.017 0.023 0.037 0.031 0.037 0.039
LOSS_DUM t-1 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.283 0.000 0.151
ICR 0,t-1 3.118 2.942 2.364 2.883 3.538 3.365 3.156 4.060
ICR 5,t-1 0.000 1.056 0.000 1.346 0.000 0.711 0.000 1.762
ICR 10,t-1 0.000 0.374 0.000 1.286 0.000 0.164 0.000 1.550
ICR 20,t-1 0.000 0.224 0.000 1.652 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.485
LEVERAGE t-1 0.302 0.408 0.235 0.273 0.397 0.511 0.343 0.386
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 1.046 1.290 0.684 0.899 1.413 1.641 1.230 1.452
TANGIBILITY t-1 -0.038 -0.024 0.061 0.107 -0.213 -0.233 0.110 0.043
UTILITY_DUM t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.172
FINANCIAL_DUM t 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.418 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.104
SOVEREIGN_RATING t 19.000 18.475 19.000 18.510 19.000 18.717 19.000 17.536
NET_DEBT t -0.018 0.038 0.012 0.060 0.012 0.082 0.026 0.077
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t 0.000 0.246 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021
RETURN t 0.094 0.099 0.093 0.094 0.140 0.073 0.044 0.055
CAPEX/TANG t-1 -4.329 -24.681 10.054 65.441 -3.942 -7.627 10.728 150.131
CAPEX/AT t-1 3.129 4.878 3.882 6.841 3.500 6.071 5.954 7.268
(CAPEX+RD)/AT t-1 4.195 5.390 4.214 7.437 6.619 6.661 6.152 7.719
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 1.000 0.541 1.000 0.599 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.490
DIV_PAYOUT t-1 0.000 32.544 20.595 30.265 0.000 33.320 0.000 -16.306
DIV_YIELD t-1 1.494 2.259 2.372 2.820 1.931 1.743 1.945 2.395
DIV/ASSETS t-1 0.001 0.750 0.231 1.123 0.000 3.311 0.000 5.012
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.172
SHARE_REPUR t-1 0.000 0.711 0.000 2.764 0.000 3.117 0.000 2.841
SHARE_REPUR/ASSETS t-1 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.225 0.000 0.216
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4.3 Methods analyzing the effect of private equity on credit quality 
 
4.3.1 Credit ratings 
 
Credit rating agencies hold vast amounts of non-public information on the companies they 
analyze along with public information available to all. Thus, the informational content of the 
rating opinions can help understand the possibly exploitative nature of private equity 
ownership. In the context of the Wealth Expropriation Hypothesis, rating agencies would 
observe exploitative qualities in PE-backed firms’ governance that suggest a lower credit rating. 
Alternatively, if the Reputation Acquisition Hypothesis holds, rating agencies take note of the 
bondholder-friendly practices resulting from the private equity owners’ reputational concerns 
and award the PE-backed firms with higher credit ratings.  
 
To analyze the effect of private equity ownership in a portfolio company’s bond rating, I 
estimate Model 1 for S&P (Moody’s) ratings using S&P_RATINGt (MOODY’S_RATINGt) as 
the dependent variable and the specified independent variables.  
 
(1) 
𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡(𝑀𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑌
′𝑆 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝐼𝑉 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐼𝐶𝑅0,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐼𝐶𝑅5,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐼𝐶𝑅10,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐼𝐶𝑅20,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑇𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽20𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽21𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡
+ 𝛽24𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽25𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
28
𝑘=26
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
32
𝑘=29
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
47
𝑘=33
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖  
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The slightly adjusted Model 2 amends the previous model to fit the corporate loan sample with 
the introduction of two loan market-specific variables (EXTENDABLE DUM_t REVOLVER 
DUM_t). Both Models 1 and 2 are estimated for S&P and Moody’s credit ratings. 
 
(2) 
𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡(𝑀𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑌
′𝑆 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑉𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝑀 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝐼𝑉 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐼𝐶𝑅0,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐼𝐶𝑅5,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐼𝐶𝑅10,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝐼𝐶𝑅20,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽20𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑇𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝛽21𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1
+ 𝛽22𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽23𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽24𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽25𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽26𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽27𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 ∑ 𝛽𝑘
30
𝑘=28
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
34
𝑘=31
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
50
𝑘=35
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 
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4.3.2 Bond yields and loan spreads 
 
Bond yield spreads and loan spreads hold information on the borrower’s creditworthiness from 
the lender’s point of view. Generally, the information portrayed by bond spreads is solely based 
on public sources, aside from the non-public information affecting the publicly available credit 
rating. Thus, in the context of private equity ownership, bonds spreads offer the market’s view 
of the portfolio company’s governance structures and creditworthiness. However, in the case 
of loan spreads, banks and other private lenders often have access to non-public information 
(Hale and Santos, 2009). This can possibly result in somewhat different implications on the 
effect of private equity ownership on a portfolio company’s cost of debt, when compared to 
decisions made solely based on publicly available information. If the Wealth Expropriation 
Hypothesis holds, bond market investors and private lenders have observed the private equity 
owner to exploit other stakeholders of the issuing firm, causing them to demand higher yields 
on the portfolio company’s debt. Alternatively, debtholder-friendly governance structures 
would be rewarded with lower borrowing costs under the Reputation Acquisition Hypothesis.  
 
To study the effect of private equity ownership in a portfolio company’s bond yield spreads, I 
estimate Model 3 using YIELD_SPREADt as the dependent variable and a variation of the 
specified independent variables.  
 
(3) 
𝑌𝐼𝐸𝐿𝐷 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐴𝑈𝐿𝑇 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑀 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐼𝑉 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐼𝐶𝑅0,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐼𝐶𝑅5,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐼𝐶𝑅10,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐼𝐶𝑅20,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑇𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝛽20𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1
+ 𝛽21𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽22𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽23𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡
+ 𝛽24𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽25𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽26𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
29
𝑘=27
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
33
𝑘=30
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
48
𝑘=34
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛽49𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡  + 𝛽50𝑀𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑌
′𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡 
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The slightly adjusted Model 4 amends the previous model to fit the corporate loan sample by 
using (LOAN_SPREADt) as the dependent variable and introducing the loan market-specific 
variables to the list of independent variables. 
 
(4) 
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑋𝑇𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑉𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑂𝑅𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑇 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐴𝐿 𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑀 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝐼𝑉 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝛽12𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐼𝐶𝑅0,𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐼𝐶𝑅5,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽17𝐼𝐶𝑅10,𝑡−1 + 𝛽18𝐼𝐶𝑅20,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽20𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑇𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑡−1
+ 𝛽21𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽22𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽23𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽24𝑆𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽25𝑁𝐸𝑇 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽26𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽27𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
30
𝑘=28
𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
34
𝑘=31
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
50
𝑘=35
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽51𝑆&𝑃 𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡  + 𝛽52𝑀𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑌
′𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑡 
 
Both Models 3 & 4 are first estimated without controlling for variation resulting from the credit 
rating of the bond or loan, followed by a specification that introduces the credit rating variables 
presented in Section 4.3.1. The second specification was chosen to better account for the 
implicit relationship between a higher credit rating and lower borrowing costs, which can be 
considered as a reward for better creditworthiness. Thus, the latter specification, which accounts 
for the informational content of credit ratings, better highlights the true effect of private equity 
ownership on a portfolio company’s cost of debt. 
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4.4 Methods studying PE sponsorship’s effect on investment and payout policies  
 
4.4.1 Investment policies 
 
To determine, whether private equity-owned companies resort to excessive investments and 
thus exploit their debtholders, the analysis is complemented by studying three different 
investment ratios over the three years following a bond issuance or loan withdrawal. If the 
Overinvestment Hypothesis holds and private equity-backed firms resort to bondholder value 
destroying investments to benefit their PE owner, PE-sponsored companies should record 
higher investment ratios than their non-PE-backed peer companies. The three dependent 
variables used in the analysis are consistent with prior literature, with a company’s capital 
expenditure relative to its tangible assets (CAPEX/TANGt,t+2) being the most widely used (e.g. 
Polk and Sapienza, 2008; Huang et al., 2016). Further, to allow for consistency with the US-
based Huang et al. (2016) study, I also introduce the ratios accounting for capital expenditure 
and total investment (capital and R&D) relative the firms total assets (CAPEX/ATt,t+2 and 
(CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2), that were first introduced by Agrawal and Nasser (2012) and Anderson 
et al. (2012).  
 
To study whether private equity-backed companies’ use of bond or loan proceeds for 
investment purposes differs from the non-PE-backed firms, I estimate Model 5 using the three 
alternative dependent variables CAPEX/TANGt,t+2, CAPEX/ATt,t+2 and (CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2 
and the independent variables laid out in Model 5. The same model and set of variables 
specified for the loan market is also used when analyzing the effect of PE ownership effect on 
companies’ investment policies in the corporate loan sample.  
 
(5) 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑡,𝑡+2
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑇𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋 𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
17
𝑘=15
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁) 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
21
𝑘=18
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
36
𝑘=22
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖  
34 
 
 
 
4.4.2 Dividend policies 
 
When studying the effect of private equity ownership on a company’s dividend payout policy, 
I use four distinct dividend ratios variables widely used in prior literature (see e.g. Barclay et 
al., 2009; Bodnaruk and Österberg, 2013). If the Excessive Dividend Hypothesis holds, I 
observe PE-backed companies to pay out overly large dividends to their private equity owners 
after a bond issuance or loan withdrawal. Thus, the observed dividend ratios for PE-sponsored 
firms would be significantly above those of the non-PE-backed companies. However, as Kalay 
(1982) reports, covenant restricting dividend payout are common in bond and loan contract and 
with this type of covenants in place, evidence for the Excessive Dividend Hypothesis might be 
left unnoticed. 
 
To analyze whether private equity owners receive out-of-the-ordinary dividends from their 
portfolio companies around bond issues and loan withdrawals, I estimate Model 6 using the 
four alternative dependent variables (DIV_PAYER_DUMt,t+2, DIV_PAYOUTt,t+2, 
DIV_YIELDt,t+2 and DIV/ASSETSt,t+2) and the set of detailed independent variables. For 
consistency, the same model and a set of independent variables specified for the loan market is 
used when conducting the dividend policy analysis with the corporate loan data.  
 
(6) 
𝐷𝐼𝑉/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡,𝑡+2
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑇𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐷𝐼𝑉/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
17
𝑘=15
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁) 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
21
𝑘=18
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
36
𝑘=22
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 
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4.4.3 Share repurchases 
 
When studying the effect of share repurchases as an alternative form of excessive shareholder 
compensation alongside dividends, I take the dependent variables from the dividend policy 
analysis, as introduced used by e.g. Barclay et al. (2009) and Bodnaruk and Österberg (2013). 
Given the theoretical indifference between dividends and share repurchases in a frictionless 
market, I modify the dependent variables from the dividend policy analysis to account for share 
repurchases rather than dividends. If the Buyback Exit Hypothesis holds, I notice private equity 
owned firms to perform more share repurchases after a bond issuance and loan issuance and the 
share repurchase ratios would be significantly higher for PE-backed issuers when comparing 
with the non-PE-owned firms.  
 
To study whether private equity owners use share repurchases as a method of excessive 
remuneration from their portfolio companies around bond issues or loan withdrawals, I estimate 
Model 7 using the three alternative dependent variables (SHARE_REPUR_DUMt,t+2, 
SHARE_REPURt,t+2 and SHARE_REPUR/ASSETSt,t+2) and the following set of independent 
variables; 
 
(7) 
𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑅/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡,𝑡+2
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑀 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝐼𝑉 𝑃𝐴𝑌𝐸𝑅 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑀𝐴𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑇 𝑇𝑂 𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐾𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐼𝐴𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑆𝐻𝐴𝑅𝐸 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑅/𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
17
𝑘=15
𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 (𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁) 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
21
𝑘=18
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘
36
𝑘=22
𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑌 𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖  
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5. Analysis and empirical results  
 
This section presents the empirical findings of the thesis by first analyzing the effect of private 
equity ownership on credit metrics of portfolio companies. The credit rating and spread analyses 
as well as the investment and payout policy analyses are conducted and reported for both the 
debt capital markets sample and the corporate loan sample, using both the focused [IPO+0, 
IPO+6] sample and the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample. 
 
5.1 Credit rating evidence 
 
Table 3 presents the results for credit rating analysis using the debt capital markets sample. In 
the case of S&P ratings, when studying the statistical significance of the private equity dummy 
variable coefficient (PE_DUMt), I can note that private equity ownership does not seem to have 
an effect on the portfolio companies’ rating in the [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample. However, I do find 
evidence from the larger [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample suggesting that private equity-backed 
companies would be rated approximately two notches lower than the non-PE-backed companies 
by S&P. With the observable increase in sample size, this finding is statistically significant at 
the 10% level. More revealing findings can be observed from Moody’s ratings, as the 
coefficient of PE_DUMt suggests approximately two and three notches lower ratings for PE-
sponsored companies in the [IPO+0, IPO+6] and [IPO+0, IPO+12] samples, respectively, both 
at the 1% significance level. This finding is novel to Europe, as Huang et al. (2016) only record 
an approximately one notch higher S&P rating for bonds issued by PE-backed companies and 
fail to detect any significant difference resulting from private equity ownership in Moody’s 
ratings.  
 
Further, coefficients of the control variables are largely as expected, i.e. subordinated bonds 
(SUBORD_DUMt) and bonds issued by loss making companies (LOSS_DUMt-1) or companies 
with a preexisting large net debt position (NET_DEBTt) receive lower ratings. On the other 
hand, stable financial sector issuers (FINANCIAL_DUMt) and issuers with significant tangible 
assets (TANGIBILITYt-1) are viewed as a credit positive factor by the rating agencies. The 
coefficients of the control variables are also in the same range and of the same sign as in the 
US-based study of Huang et al. (2016), suggesting that the determinants of a company’s credit 
rating do not vary across continents to a large extent. 
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Table 3. Bond credit ratings – Ordered logit regression analysis results 
 
This table presents the ordered logit regression results of the bond credit rating analysis for both the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
sample (1-2) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (3-4), that cover all bonds issued between immediately after and 
a maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. The analysis is run with both S&P and Moody’s 
ratings with the dependent variables S&P_RATINGt and MOODY’S_RATINGt, where 19 corresponds to a S&P rating AAA 
and a Moody’s rating Aaa and 1 corresponds to a S&P rating CCC- and a Moody’s rating Caa3. Coefficients and z-statistics 
are reported for independent variables. PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond issuer 
was backed by a private equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. 
Definitions for the remaining independent variables are provided in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and z-statistics for the 
bond period dummy variables (BOND_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-
specific dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. Analysis is run with robust standard errors 
correcting for heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the bond issuer level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, 
** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6] [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable S&P_RATING t MOODY’S_RATING t S&P_RATING t MOODY’S_RATING t
Model # 1 2 3 4
Independent Variables coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z|
PE_DUM t -1.638 0.256 -2.208 *** 0.005 -1.949 * 0.054 -3.150 *** 0.000
PROCEEDS t 0.125 0.344 0.224 0.197 0.135 0.115 0.073 0.370
MATURITY t 0.026 0.165 0.014 0.444 0.035 *** 0.003 0.035 0.110
SUBORD_DUM t -1.201 ** 0.038 -1.418 *** 0.001 -1.881 *** 0.000 -2.028 *** 0.000
FIRST_BOND_DUM t -0.424 0.350 -0.418 0.390 0.963 ** 0.013 -0.370 0.337
TOTAL_BONDS t 0.012 0.276 0.010 0.286 0.019 *** 0.002 0.007 0.178
M_CAP t-1 0.020 *** 0.007 0.029 *** 0.002 0.019 *** 0.001 0.020 *** 0.000
AGE t 0.039 ** 0.021 0.049 *** 0.002 0.025 ** 0.049 0.028 *** 0.004
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 1.346 ** 0.029 0.649 0.389 1.134 ** 0.041 0.701 0.167
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 -1.292 0.345 -1.523 0.165 -0.824 0.125 -0.584 0.221
ROA t-1 6.529 0.139 -0.174 0.979 3.247 0.504 2.844 0.422
LOSS_DUM t-1 -2.467 *** 0.002 -2.099 ** 0.011 -2.482 *** 0.000 -2.246 *** 0.000
ICR 0,t-1 0.388 ** 0.024 0.897 * 0.072 0.046 0.579 -0.063 0.513
ICR 5,t-1 -0.303 0.112 -0.080 0.702 0.005 0.960 -0.003 0.976
ICR 10,t-1 -0.180 * 0.089 0.039 0.649 -0.098 0.152 0.023 0.767
ICR 20,t-1 0.099 0.127 0.136 * 0.082 0.043 * 0.059 0.058 0.132
LEVERAGE t-1 2.206 0.160 5.031 ** 0.038 0.374 0.791 0.801 0.585
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 -0.341 0.628 -0.874 0.187 0.158 0.652 0.576 0.113
TANGIBILITY t-1 3.961 *** 0.003 3.963 *** 0.000 3.558 *** 0.001 4.532 *** 0.000
UTILITY_DUM t 1.024 0.170 3.010 *** 0.000 0.604 0.215 2.032 *** 0.000
FINANCIAL_DUM t 3.302 *** 0.004 6.141 *** 0.001 3.196 *** 0.000 5.131 *** 0.000
SOVEREIGN_RATING t 0.382 ** 0.017 0.031 0.826 0.082 0.696 0.093 0.505
NET_DEBT t -1.341 0.234 -1.952 ** 0.031 -1.473 *** 0.003 -2.198 *** 0.007
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t 1.504 0.307 3.242 * 0.062 1.536 0.298 1.900 0.396
RETURN t 1.811 *** 0.004 2.451 *** 0.000 1.015 *** 0.003 0.387 0.310
n 375 366 993 994
Pseudo R
2
0.299 0.339 0.277 0.283
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Table 4, on the other hand, presents the credit rating analysis using the corporate loan sample, 
from which I can note that the result on bond ratings no longer holds in the corporate loan 
setting. When first looking at the credit ratings issued by S&P, I can note from the analysis that 
in the [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period, with the coefficient of PE_DUMt at -6.828, PE-backed 
companies would be rated 7 notches below their non-PE-backed peers. This observation, which 
is significant at the 10% level, seems fairly extreme, when compared to the statistically 
insignificant coefficient of PE_DUMt of 0.134 in the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period. 
This observation is further backed by the findings of the same analysis conducted with Moody’s 
ratings as I can observe a similar pattern of the coefficient of PE_DUMt in the Moody’s rating 
analysis.  
 
When studying the coefficient of PE_DUMt for Moody’s ratings, I note that the coefficient of 
the private equity dummy variable is insignificant in both sampling periods [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
and [IPO+0, IPO+12], suggesting that private equity ownership does not seem to have a 
statistically meaningful relation with Moody’s rating on the loan. Further, similar to the pattern 
in S&P rating analysis, the coefficient of PE_DUMt is economically significant (-1.744) in the 
[IPO+0, IPO+6] period, but diminishes in economic significance when moving to the larger 
[IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period. The fairly extreme coefficients of PE_DUMt in the [IPO+0, 
IPO+6] period that do not survive when increasing the sample size in the [IPO+0, IPO+12] 
period could suggest that the smaller sample is dominated by a few poorly rated PE-backed 
companies. Thus, with the increase in sample size, there is neither statistical nor economic 
difference in the ratings for PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms for both S&P and Moody’s.  
 
I can thereby safely speculate that the findings could more be the result of a small sample size 
and a few outlying PE-backed debt issuers in the [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period rather than 
a genuine implication of private equity-backed companies’ poor credit quality resulting from 
exploitative shareholder behavior. The signs of the coefficients for the control variables seem 
largely reasonable and comparable with those in the debt capital markets analysis. However, 
the lack of statistical significance of the control variables in the corporate loan analysis suggests 
in general that the loan issuer rating is less dependent on the issue and recent performance-
related characteristics of a company when compared to the bond ratings.  
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Table 4. Loan credit ratings – Ordered logit regression analysis results 
 
This table presents the ordered logit regression results of the loan credit rating analysis for both the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
sample (1-2) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (3-4), that cover all loans announced between immediately after 
and a maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. The analysis is run with both S&P and Moody’s 
ratings with the dependent variables S&P_RATINGt and MOODY’S_RATINGt, where 19 corresponds to a S&P rating AAA 
and a Moody’s rating Aaa and 1 corresponds to a S&P rating CCC- and a Moody’s rating Caa3. Coefficients and z-statistics 
are reported for independent variables. PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the borrower was 
backed by a private equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions 
for the remaining independent variables are provided in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and z-statistics for the loan period 
dummy variables (LOAN_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific dummy 
variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. Analysis is run with robust standard errors correcting for 
heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the borrower level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6] [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable S&P_RATING t MOODY’S_RATING t S&P_RATING t MOODY’S_RATING t
Model # 1 2 3 4
Independent Variables coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z|
PE_DUM t -6.828 * 0.054 -1.744 0.614 0.134 0.854 -0.220 0.728
PROCEEDS t 0.252 *** 0.001 0.309 *** 0.000 0.130 ** 0.043 0.171 ** 0.011
MATURITY t -0.051 * 0.057 0.080 0.510 -0.073 0.284 -0.105 0.144
EXTENDABLE_DUM t 0.667 0.326 0.980 0.349 0.292 0.278 0.492 0.146
REVOLVER_DUM t 0.383 0.179 0.086 0.803 0.377 0.143 0.400 * 0.071
SUBORD_DUM t 0.388 0.832 -4.679 0.290 -2.164 * 0.067 -3.628 *** 0.008
FIRST_LOAN_DUM t 0.291 0.568 0.392 0.578 -0.093 0.764 -0.022 0.948
TOTAL_LOANS t 0.162 0.106 -0.014 0.899 0.008 0.743 -0.014 0.587
M_CAP t-1 0.016 0.133 0.053 *** 0.000 0.023 *** 0.000 0.035 *** 0.000
AGE t -0.010 0.467 -0.018 0.411 -0.007 0.423 0.011 0.154
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 2.942 0.147 -1.381 0.434 1.932 ** 0.048 0.526 0.677
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 -1.430 * 0.100 -0.624 0.451 0.267 0.584 -0.272 0.499
ROA t-1 5.069 0.430 -2.397 0.632 1.676 0.731 0.236 0.930
LOSS_DUM t-1 -1.201 0.452 -1.612 0.362 -0.805 0.219 0.188 0.808
ICR 0,t-1 0.453 * 0.089 0.050 0.841 0.154 0.201 0.057 0.641
ICR 5,t-1 -0.401 0.208 -0.053 0.911 -0.183 0.225 0.059 0.728
ICR 10,t-1 -0.086 0.713 -0.087 0.820 -0.024 0.850 -0.166 0.294
ICR 20,t-1 -0.008 0.810 0.068 0.165 0.052 *** 0.006 0.057 *** 0.003
LEVERAGE t-1 4.255 0.160 -0.360 0.935 -1.899 0.268 -0.442 0.805
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 0.694 0.192 -0.189 0.969 0.010 0.983 0.263 0.492
TANGIBILITY t-1 1.566 0.435 0.347 0.859 0.174 0.880 2.114 ** 0.027
UTILITY_DUM t 0.916 0.594 1.728 0.316 1.981 ** 0.011 2.286 *** 0.001
FINANCIAL_DUM t 3.128 ** 0.023 1.977 0.371 2.309 0.125 2.052 ** 0.014
SOVEREIGN_RATING t -0.433 0.418 0.625 0.563 0.217 * 0.076 0.347 * 0.070
NET_DEBT t 0.559 0.772 0.734 0.721 0.183 0.839 -0.051 0.950
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t 1.909 ** 0.022 1.548 * 0.056 -0.254 0.745 1.114 0.119
RETURN t 1.933 ** 0.047 2.163 0.113 0.379 0.449 0.780 0.228
n 180 156 416 373
Pseudo R
2
0.388 0.401 0.227 0.254
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5.2 Bond yield and loan spread evidence 
 
Table 5 portrays the results of the bond yield spread analysis using the debt capital markets 
sample and the analysis is first run without controlling for the credit rating of the bond (1 & 3), 
followed by a model specification (2 & 4) where the variation caused by the bonds’ credit 
ratings has been controlled for.  
 
By first looking at the statistical significance of the coefficient for the private equity dummy 
variable (PE_DUMt) in the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample, I can note that coefficient at 
33.378 remains insignificant before controlling for the credit rating of the bond. However, after 
controlling for S&P and Moody’s ratings, the analysis yields a coefficient of 93.025 for 
PE_DUMt, which is significant at the 10% level. This finding suggests that, without controlling 
for the credit ratings of the bonds, the yield spreads for bonds issued by PE-backed companies 
do not statistically differ from the yield spreads of non-PE-backed companies’ bonds. However, 
when controlling for the credit risk portrayed by the rating agencies credit opinions, PE-backed 
companies receive bond financing with a 93 basis points higher yield spread compared to the 
non-PE-backed companies. As a result, I find that, although yield spreads do not significantly 
differ from one to another in the overall [IPO+0, IPO+6] period, private equity-sponsored 
companies receive bond financing with slightly more expensive terms than their non-PE-backed 
peers in the same credit rating notch. 
 
When conducting the same analysis with the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample, without controlling 
for the credit rating of the bond, I observe a coefficient of 94.422 for the private equity dummy 
variable (PE_DUMt), which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The result survives also 
after controlling for the information contained by the bonds’ credit ratings, with the coefficient 
of PE_DUMt standing at 91.775 – a result, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Thus, in the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample, the yield spread for private equity-sponsored firms 
are on average higher than those of the non-PE-backed companies regardless of controlling for 
S&P and Moody’s credit ratings or not. This observation clearly concludes that even in the full 
sampling period, private equity-backed companies receive bond financing with a 92 basis points 
higher yield spread when comparing to the non-PE-backed firms of the same credit rating notch.  
 
When comparing the observations on the yield spreads of European PE-backed bond issuers to 
the US-based results of Huang et al. (2016), I find that again the implications differ quite 
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significantly from one continent to another. While I find PE-backed companies to receive bond 
financing with higher yield spreads compared to the non-PE-backed firms, US-based private 
equity-sponsored issuers receive financing with on average 70 basis points lower yield spreads 
than the non-PE-sponsored companies do (Huang et al., 2016). Thus, my results for the bond 
yield spread analysis remain novel to Europe and the seem to be fundamentally in line with the 
results of the bond credit rating analysis, as the lower credit rating for PE-backed issuers 
observed in Section 5.1 should theoretically result in a higher cost of debt financing through an 
increased risk of default.  
 
The signs of the control variables, on the other hand, seem to be greatly in line with the results 
of Huang et al. (2016) and make theoretical sense. Making a loss in the financial year prior to 
the bond issuance (LOSS_DUMt-1) and issuing subordinated bonds (SUBORD_DUMt) imply an 
increase in the bond yield spread through a positive sign of the coefficient. Similarly, companies 
that were able to pay dividends in the financial year before the bond issuance 
(DIV_PAYER_DUMt-1) observe a decrease in the cost of their bond financing through a negative 
sign of the coefficient. Further, the negative coefficients of the credit rating variables 
S&P_RATINGt and MOODY’S_RATINGt are also in the expected range, suggesting that an 
increase in a firms rating implicitly decreases its cost of bond financing and that credit ratings 
do hold non-public information that is relevant in determining bond yield spreads.  
 
Table 6, on the other hand, presents the loan spread analysis utilizing the corporate loan sample. 
Again, the results are reported first without controlling for the credit rating of the loan (1 & 3) 
and then using a modified model (2 & 4) accounting for the variation caused by the credit 
ratings.  
 
Overall, the analysis yields similar results to the observations made in the bond market analysis, 
as I can observe a positive statistically significant coefficient for the private equity dummy 
variable PE_DUMt in both of the sampling periods. In the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling 
period, the coefficient of PE_DUMt stands at 145.774 without controlling for the loan’s credit 
rating and decreases to 70.761 after controlling for S&P and Moody’s ratings, with the 
coefficients being statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. This finding 
suggests that lenders demand higher spreads on loans withdrawn by private equity-backed 
companies when comparing with the rest of the firms in the overall sample and on average 71 
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basis points higher spreads when comparing with non-PE-backed companies in the same rating 
class. 
 
When conducting the same analysis with the larger [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample, I can observe a 
coefficient of 64.427 for PE_DUMt without controlling for the credit rating and a slightly higher 
coefficient of 93.481 after controlling for the informational content of the rating agencies’ 
opinion. The reported coefficients are statistically significant at the 10% and 1% level, 
respectively. I can note from the coefficients that, compared to the non-PE-sponsored 
companies, private equity-backed companies continue to borrow with more expensive terms 
even in the [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period and loan spreads for European sponsor-backed 
companies are on average 93 basis points above the spreads of the non-PE-backed firms in the 
same rating notch.  
 
The novel results from the loan spread analysis are in line with the bond spread analysis as both 
suggest that European private equity-backed companies pay more on their debt financing when 
compared to the non-sponsor-backed companies. Interestingly, when studying the coefficients 
of the credit rating control variables, S&P ratings (S&P_RATINGt) do not seem to have a 
statistically significant effect on the loan spreads, whereas the negative statistically significant 
coefficient MOODY’S_RATINGt portrays the implicit effect of a higher credit rating on a 
company’s borrowing costs. Similar to the results of the loan credit rating analysis discussed in 
Section 5.1, the rather fluctuating nature of the coefficient for PE_DUMt can be seen as a result 
of the fairly small number of private equity-backed companies in the sample. However, with 
the coefficient staying positive and statistically significant in all of the four model 
specifications, it is relatively safe to speulate that lenders do view European private equity-
owned companies somewhat differently from the remaining sample of firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
 
Table 5. Bond yield spreads – OLS regression analysis results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the bond yield spread analysis for both the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample 
(1-2) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (3-4), that cover all bonds issued between immediately after and a 
maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. The analysis is run with the dependent variable 
YIELD_SPREADt, which is the basis point difference of the bonds yield to maturity and the yield on a similar maturity sovereign 
bond of the country where the issuing firm is listed. MATURITYt is the bond maturity in years and similar maturity is defined 
as follows: 1-yr treasury if MATURITYt ≤ 1.5 yrs., 2-yr treasury if 1.5 yrs. < MATURITYt ≤ 2.5 yrs., 3-ys treasury if 2.5 yrs. < 
MATURITYt ≤ 4.0 yrs., 5-yr treasury if 4.0 yrs. < MATURITYt ≤ 6.0 yrs., 7-yr treasury if 6.0 yrs. < MATURITYt ≤ 8.5 yrs., 10-
yr treasury if 8.5 yrs. < MATURITYt ≤ 20.0 yrs. and 30-yr treasury if 20 yrs. < MATURITYt. Coefficients and t-statistics are 
reported for independent variables. PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond issuer was 
backed by a private equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions 
for the remaining independent variables are provided in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and t-statistics for the bond period 
dummy variables (BOND_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific 
dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. Analysis is run with robust standard errors correcting for 
heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the bond issuer level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level in a two-tailed test. 
 
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6] [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable YIELD_SPREAD t YIELD_SPREAD t YIELD_SPREAD t YIELD_SPREAD t
Model # 1 2 3 4
Independent Variables coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t 33.578 0.553 93.025 * 0.063 94.422 *** 0.008 91.775 ** 0.017
DEFAULT_SPREAD t 31.492 0.260 65.674 ** 0.025 45.432 *** 0.008 63.387 *** 0.002
PROCEEDS t 4.238 0.564 21.965 ** 0.015 8.758 ** 0.050 16.198 *** 0.002
MATURITY t 2.341 0.202 5.431 *** 0.000 0.814 0.579 2.296 * 0.095
SUBORD_DUM t 203.216 *** 0.001 72.138 0.238 149.178 *** 0.000 74.912 *** 0.003
FIRST_BOND_DUM t 64.369 * 0.051 33.854 0.441 76.324 *** 0.000 24.219 0.330
TOTAL_BONDS t -0.776 * 0.058 0.606 0.315 -0.423 0.136 0.347 * 0.079
M_CAP t-1 -0.113 0.807 0.388 0.464 -0.535 * 0.085 -0.004 0.991
AGE t -1.765 *** 0.001 -0.083 0.893 -1.763 *** 0.000 -0.362 0.494
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 -120.280 *** 0.003 15.565 0.684 -122.177 *** 0.000 -66.405 ** 0.021
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 -25.474 0.567 -17.639 0.660 -38.902 0.106 -28.170 0.232
ROA t-1 114.040 0.696 1386.298 *** 0.003 377.691 ** 0.021 171.516 0.231
LOSS_DUM t-1 148.850 *** 0.008 12.035 0.707 171.331 *** 0.000 37.770 0.275
ICR 0,t-1 -19.430 ** 0.026 -8.201 0.349 -3.714 0.461 -6.581 0.124
ICR 5,t-1 15.259 0.159 7.761 0.487 5.345 0.336 6.982 0.135
ICR 10,t-1 4.338 0.529 -4.575 0.653 -1.666 0.620 -0.148 0.969
ICR 20,t-1 -1.942 0.465 2.387 0.469 0.009 0.993 0.963 0.393
LEVERAGE t-1 57.063 0.521 124.598 0.165 14.984 0.811 -46.488 0.478
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 -27.630 0.356 -26.826 0.537 -44.743 ** 0.037 -23.349 0.376
TANGIBILITY t-1 -90.429 0.209 170.289 0.108 -12.928 0.766 63.209 0.333
UTILITY_DUM t -109.897 ** 0.046 67.540 0.240 -70.200 *** 0.006 -9.017 0.680
FINANCIAL_DUM t -159.170 *** 0.002 189.917 ** 0.021 -106.131 *** 0.001 2.781 0.947
SOVEREIGN_RATING t 13.787 0.141 8.164 0.427 23.988 *** 0.002 30.685 *** 0.000
NET_DEBT t 105.123 0.172 77.364 0.233 138.037 *** 0.000 50.772 * 0.100
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t -60.999 0.358 -21.841 0.786 -115.751 ** 0.016 -91.176 * 0.089
RETURN t -109.116 ** 0.011 14.678 0.684 66.990 ** 0.022 -66.941 *** 0.006
S&P_RATING t -26.665 * 0.061 -22.475 ** 0.024
MOODY’S_RATING t -18.673 *** 0.010 -21.449 *** 0.004
n 349 242 944 687
R
2
0.616 0.748 0.543 0.624
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Table 6. Loan spreads – OLS regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the loan spread analysis for both the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample (1-2) 
as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (3-4), that cover all loans announced between immediately after and a maximum 
of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. The analysis is run with the dependent variable 
LOAN_SPREADt, which is the basis point difference of a loan’s maximum spread and its reference rate (EURIBOR or LIBOR) 
on the loan announcement date. Coefficients and t-statistics are reported for independent variables. PE_DUMt is the private 
equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the borrower was backed by a private equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial 
public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions for the remaining independent variables are provided in Table 1. 
For brevity, coefficients and t-statistics for the loan period dummy variables (LOAN_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy 
variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. 
Analysis is run with robust standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the borrower level. 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% 
level in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6] [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable LOAN_SPREAD t LOAN_SPREAD t LOAN_SPREAD t LOAN_SPREAD t
Model # 1 2 3 4
Independent Variables coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t 145.774 *** 0.000 70.761 * 0.089 64.427 * 0.071 93.481 *** 0.002
PROCEEDS t -3.283 * 0.072 -1.290 0.607 -2.149 0.471 1.275 0.643
MATURITY t 0.365 0.851 0.159 0.952 4.595 0.533 5.911 0.478
EXTENDABLE_DUM t -30.601 0.133 -16.141 0.236 -37.028 *** 0.005 -9.681 0.587
REVOLVER_DUM t -3.911 0.620 -2.144 0.829 -31.986 * 0.052 -30.702 0.116
SUBORD_DUM t 200.903 *** 0.000 214.911 *** 0.000 228.614 *** 0.001 223.542 *** 0.000
FIRST_LOAN_DUM t 12.309 0.253 12.842 0.240 11.935 0.396 3.065 0.843
TOTAL_LOANS t 0.298 0.935 5.413 0.135 1.790 0.281 5.154 ** 0.038
M_CAP t-1 0.055 0.800 0.318 * 0.088 -0.031 0.867 0.717 *** 0.006
AGE t 0.595 0.128 1.470 *** 0.000 -0.166 0.685 0.649 * 0.052
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 -45.192 0.405 -22.294 0.384 -70.086 ** 0.013 9.727 0.835
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 -7.621 0.739 -11.220 0.665 -1.343 0.956 22.607 0.450
ROA t-1 -61.373 0.623 -89.238 0.394 33.493 0.827 25.127 0.844
LOSS_DUM t-1 -29.510 0.264 -6.392 0.857 8.091 0.775 27.962 0.408
ICR 0,t-1 -1.561 0.843 -0.547 0.906 1.019 0.825 8.822 0.341
ICR 5,t-1 -1.464 0.836 6.921 0.384 -0.807 0.905 -4.710 0.476
ICR 10,t-1 3.066 0.751 -125.261 0.142 0.049 0.993 -5.416 0.387
ICR 20,t-1 -0.322 0.783 17.829 0.108 -0.391 0.527 2.074 ** 0.031
LEVERAGE t-1 -121.422 * 0.051 -58.540 0.447 8.272 0.897 -15.932 0.815
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 10.870 0.330 15.959 * 0.065 -5.295 0.625 4.156 0.611
TANGIBILITY t-1 -74.688 ** 0.022 -46.969 0.376 -23.850 0.565 17.265 0.693
UTILITY_DUM t -40.120 0.168 -12.587 0.637 -22.923 0.408 20.534 0.526
FINANCIAL_DUM t -80.553 ** 0.016 84.646 * 0.066 -45.851 * 0.075 43.407 0.269
SOVEREIGN_RATING t 0.059 0.995 5.224 0.327 -5.916 0.228 -2.630 0.537
NET_DEBT t -46.696 0.229 -4.759 0.864 101.675 0.160 124.732 0.117
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t 47.133 0.457 17.663 0.614 54.737 0.154 47.627 0.415
RETURN t 11.566 0.508 36.030 ** 0.036 13.613 0.301 33.238 0.110
S&P_RATING t 8.228 0.183 -2.166 0.855
MOODY’S_RATING t -26.655 *** 0.002 -20.759 * 0.080
n 141 106 321 229
R
2
0.881 0.958 0.596 0.719
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5.3 Investment decision evidence 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the analysis on investment decision changes following a bond 
issuance. When first looking at the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample, I can observe statistically 
significant negative coefficients for all dependent variables used in the different specifications, 
suggesting that regardless of the specification, private equity-backed companies invest less 
relative to their size than the non-PE-owned companies do. When studying the coefficient of 
the private equity dummy variable (PE_DUMt), I can note the following three observations. On 
average, over the next three years after a bond issuance PE-backed companies invest 25.3 
percentage points (pp) less in capital expenditures relative to their tangible assets, 4.5 pp less 
in capital expenditure relative to their total assets as well as 4.5 pp less in all investments (both 
capital and R&D) relative to their total assets. The first result is statistically significant at the 
10% level, with the two latter being both significant at the 1% level. The results imply that in 
the three years following a bond issuance, PE-backed companies do not resort to excessively 
risky investments as their capital expenditure levels are below the remaining companies in the 
sample. 
 
When analyzing the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample, I can note the investment policy of PE-
backed companies, observed in the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample, does not hold anymore as 
more time passes since the PE portfolio company’s IPO. Two model specifications (Models 4 
& 6) show evidence that there is no statistically significant difference in the amount PE-backed 
and non-PE-backed companies invest relative to their size in the three years following a bond 
issuance, as the coefficient for the private equity dummy variable in models specified for 
CAPEX/TANGt,t+2 and (CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2 are both statistically insignificant. However, when 
studying the private equity-backed companies’ capital expenditure relative to their total assets 
(CAPEX/ATt,t+2), I still observe a coefficient of -2.738 for PE_DUMt, which is significant at the 
5% level. This result suggests that, while the clearly noticeable difference in investment policies 
between PE-backed and non-PE-backed companies has largely diminished, when moving to 
the larger [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period, I still find evidence suggesting that the private 
equity-sponsored firms would spend on average 2.7 pp less in capital expenditure relative to 
their total assets. Thus, even in the full sampling period extending up to 12 years since the 
company’s initial public offering, I do not find evidence of excessive investment levels for PE-
backed companies compared to the non-PE-backed firms. 
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When contrasting my results with those observed by Huang et al. (2016), I can note that my 
results are of the same sign and magnitude as those observed in the US-based study. The 
coefficient of PE_DUMt, stood in different model specifications at -8.63 for CAPEX/TANGt,t+2, 
at -3.69 for CAPEX/ATt,t+2 and at -3.68 for (CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2. However, the authors only 
find the spending on capital expenditure relative to a company’s tangible assets to be 
statistically significant (at the 5% level), implying that PE-sponsored companies spend 8.6 pp 
less in capital expenditures relative to their tangible assets when compared to the general 
corporate sample. Coefficients for the control variables in my analysis are to some extent of the 
same sign as in the US-based study of Huang et al. (2016), for example those of 
MARKET_TO_BOOKt-1 and UTILITY_DUMt. Thus, with no sign of exploitative investment 
policies, the observation of private equity portfolio companies spending less in capital 
expenditures after a bond offering holds almost equally in Europe and in the US. 
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Table 7. Investment decisions after a bond issuance – Tobit regression results 
 
This table presents the Tobit regression results of the analysis of investment decisions following a bond issuance for both the 
narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample (1-3) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (4-6), that cover all bonds issued 
between immediately after and a maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. The analysis is run 
with the three following dependent variables; CAPEX/TANGt,t+2 is the three-year average (bond issue year t and two preceding 
financial years t+1, t+2 for all) capital expenditure divided by the tangible assets at the beginning of the bond issue year, 
CAPEX/ATt,t+2 is the three-year average capital expenditure divided by the total assets at the beginning of the bond issue year 
and (CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2 is the three-year average of the sum of capital expenditure and R&D investments divided by the total 
assets at the beginning of the bond issue year. Coefficients and t-statistics are reported for independent variables. PE_DUMt is 
the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond issuer was backed by a private equity or venture capital sponsor 
on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions for the remaining independent variables are provided 
in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and t-statistics for the bond period dummy variables (BOND_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period 
dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the 
table. Tobit regressions are run with a lower limit of zero. The analysis is conducted with robust standard errors correcting for 
heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the bond issuer level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6] [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable CAPEX/TANG t,t+2 CAPEX/AT t,t+2 (CAPEX+RD)/AT t,t+2 CAPEX/TANG t,t+2 CAPEX/AT t,t+2 (CAPEX+RD)/AT t,t+2
Model # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Independent Variables coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t -25.278 * 0.051 -4.488 *** 0.000 -4.473 *** 0.001 27.048 0.445 -2.738 ** 0.015 -2.013 0.103
TANGIBILITY t-1 26.149 ** 0.041 2.189 0.119 2.251 0.132 77.079 ** 0.011 4.382 *** 0.000 4.787 *** 0.000
M_CAP t-1 0.192 ** 0.019 -0.001 0.877 -0.001 0.890 0.186 0.264 0.002 0.730 -0.001 0.853
AGE t 0.088 0.456 0.004 0.686 0.004 0.756 0.334 0.210 -0.001 0.927 0.003 0.850
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 16.850 * 0.064 -1.546 * 0.063 -1.429 * 0.078 51.289 0.234 -0.582 0.461 -0.710 0.371
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 -4.571 0.607 -2.113 *** 0.008 -2.348 *** 0.009 34.309 0.369 -0.793 0.335 -0.617 0.501
ROA t-1 138.560 0.153 -20.253 ** 0.036 -17.841 * 0.072 -13.484 0.901 -0.308 0.965 0.097 0.103
LOSS_DUM t-1 8.213 0.468 -0.225 0.859 0.035 0.980 27.545 0.400 0.397 0.573 0.508 0.494
LEVERAGE t-1 -9.343 0.710 -0.817 0.739 -2.038 0.399 45.382 0.460 0.569 0.790 -0.945 0.671
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 -1.053 0.811 3.472 *** 0.000 3.408 *** 0.000 -3.072 0.640 2.579 *** 0.000 2.871 *** 0.000
UTILITY_DUM t 19.636 0.108 -1.132 0.220 -1.890 ** 0.044 46.071 ** 0.032 -1.215 ** 0.035 -1.512 *** 0.009
FINANCIAL_DUM t -5.048 0.651 -5.577 *** 0.000 -6.505 *** 0.000 37.298 0.332 -4.756 *** 0.000 -5.350 *** 0.000
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t -7.169 0.804 0.186 0.908 -4.274 0.804 18.120 0.566 -0.911 0.550 -1.822 0.252
CAPEX/TANG t-1 -0.006 *** 0.000 0.003 0.787
CAPEX/AT t-1 0.009 0.670 0.040 * 0.061
(CAPEX+RD)/AT t-1 0.012 0.461 0.037 ** 0.023
n 467 467 467 1197 1197 1197
Pseudo R
2
0.045 0.190 0.190 0.015 0.178 0.175
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Table 8 shows the observations on investment policy changes following a loan withdrawal. 
First analyzing the results of the analysis run with the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample, I notice 
that none of the coefficients for the private equity dummy variable (PE_DUMt) in the different 
model specifications (CAPEX/TANGt,t+2, CAPEX/ATt,t+2 and (CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2) yield a 
statistically significant result. This result implies that in the three years following a loan 
withdrawal, PE-backed companies do not invest more relative to their size, when comparing 
with the similar non-PE-backed companies in the sample. However, when analyzing the 
economic significance of the results, the coefficient of 336.346 for PE_DUMt in the 
CAPEX/TANGt,t+2 model specification seems rather extreme and the two latter coefficients in 
Models 2 and 3 seem rather small compared to the results observed in Table 7, when conducting 
the same analysis with the debt capital markets sample. This might of course suggest that the 
bond issuers and loan borrowers differ in terms of their investment policies, but as before with 
my novel corporate loan sample, the relatively small amount of observations in the focused 
[IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period can affect the reliability of the result. 
 
When shifting the focus over to the full [IPO+0, IPO+12], I can observe that the coefficients 
for the private equity dummy variable are largely in line with those observed in the debt capital 
markets sample in Models 4-6 of Table 7. The analysis yields PE_DUMt coefficients of 32.153 
for CAPEX/TANGt,t+2 specification followed by coefficients of -2.185 and -2.663 for 
CAPEX/ATt,t+2 and (CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2 specifications, respectively, with the latter two 
showing statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels. The result implies that, similar to the 
debt capital markets sample, PE-backed companies tend to spend on average 2.2 pp less in 
capital expenditure relative to their total assets and 2.7 pp less in capital and R&D expenditure 
relative to their total assets. Interestingly, this result again holds even up to 12 years since the 
company’s initial public offering and no overly risky investment policies resulting from the 
private equity ownership can be observed from the sample, when compared to the non-PE-
sponsor peer group. 
 
Further, the similarity of observed PE_DUMt coefficients between investment decisions after a 
bond issuance and a loan withdrawal in the [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period provides some 
evidence for the small amount of observations in the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period, 
possibly affecting the analysis on loans withdrawn up to six years since the company’s IPO. 
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Table 8. Investment decisions after a loan withdrawal – Tobit regression results 
 
This table presents the Tobit regression results of the analysis of investment decisions following a loan withdrawal for both the 
narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample (1-3) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (4-6), that cover all loans issued between 
immediately after and a maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. The analysis is run with the 
three following dependent variables; CAPEX/TANGt,t+2 is the three-year average (loan withdrawal year t and two preceding 
financial years t+1, t+2 for all) capital expenditure divided by the tangible assets at the beginning of the loan withdrawal year, 
CAPEX/ATt,t+2 is the three-year average capital expenditure divided by the total assets at the beginning of the loan withdrawal 
year and (CAPEX+RD)/ATt,t+2 is the three-year average of the sum of capital expenditure and R&D investments divided by the 
total assets at the beginning of the loan withdrawal year. Coefficients and t-statistics are reported for independent variables. 
PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the borrower was backed by a private equity or venture 
capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions for the remaining independent 
variables are provided in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and t-statistics for the loan period dummy variables 
(LOAN_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific dummy variables 
(COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. Tobit regressions are run with a lower limit of zero. The analysis is conducted 
with robust standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the borrower level. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level in a two-
tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6] [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable CAPEX/TANG t,t+2 CAPEX/AT t,t+2 (CAPEX+RD)/AT t,t+2 CAPEX/TANG t,t+2 CAPEX/AT t,t+2 (CAPEX+RD)/AT t,t+2
Model # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Independent Variables coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t 336.345 0.268 -0.837 0.592 -0.877 0.603 32.153 0.830 -2.185 ** 0.017 -2.663 *** 0.008
TANGIBILITY t-1 -128.482 0.838 1.362 0.490 0.195 0.923 -30.430 0.821 0.678 0.638 0.024 0.987
M_CAP t-1 2.037 0.365 -0.013 0.331 -0.013 0.341 -1.102 0.295 -0.002 0.806 -0.009 0.263
AGE t -1.064 0.793 0.009 0.655 0.008 0.717 1.172 0.555 -0.016 * 0.097 -0.002 0.866
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 -843.772 ** 0.018 1.495 0.480 1.807 0.439 108.993 0.572 1.327 0.291 1.460 0.262
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 393.739 0.560 0.050 0.974 -0.291 0.854 133.794 0.470 -0.666 0.392 -0.645 0.424
ROA t-1 -593.500 0.535 -13.039 0.116 -11.501 0.185 -570.409 0.347 -11.001 ** 0.036 -12.320 * 0.053
LOSS_DUM t-1 -111.919 0.516 -2.720 * 0.071 -3.084 * 0.057 -205.203 0.173 -1.829 * 0.059 -2.535 ** 0.023
LEVERAGE t-1 -878.246 0.277 -0.824 0.847 -3.361 0.466 -201.078 0.425 0.353 0.905 -1.834 0.559
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 14.095 0.785 1.208 ** 0.018 0.887 * 0.098 0.781 0.980 1.671 ** 0.017 1.620 ** 0.033
UTILITY_DUM t 20.557 0.920 0.360 0.758 -0.227 0.849 202.299 0.148 -1.492 0.490 -1.693 ** 0.033
FINANCIAL_DUM t 127.302 0.645 -2.841 0.145 -3.200 0.110 -62.376 0.629 -3.225 *** 0.010 -3.805 *** 0.006
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t 93.242 0.295 0.124 0.812 0.059 0.923 81.928 0.396 -1.035 0.171 -1.379 0.128
CAPEX/TANG t-1 -0.034 * 0.068 -0.036 * 0.054
CAPEX/AT t-1 0.472 *** 0.000 0.441 *** 0.000
(CAPEX+RD)/AT t-1 0.560 *** 0.000 0.496 *** 0.000
n 189 189 189 450 450 450
R
2
0.284 0.214 0.216 0.006 0.156 0.158
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5.4 Dividend policy evidence 
 
Table 9 illustrates the findings of the analysis on dividend policy changes following a bond 
issuance. When studying the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period (Panel A), I can first 
note the positive sign of the coefficients for PE_DUMt in Models 1 and 2. This implies that, in 
the context of DIV_PAYER_DUMt,t+2 specification, private equity-sponsored firms are more 
likely to pay out dividends in the three years following the bond issuance, when compared to 
the non-PE-backed companies of the sample. However, the PE_DUMt coefficient is only 
statistically significant (at the 5% level) in Model 1, whereas, after controlling for the lagged 
dividend payer dummy variable, the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. Huang et al. 
(2016) observe the similar, although opposite, pattern, as the US-based PE-backed bond issuers 
are less likely to pay out dividends than their non-PE-backed peers. However, the observed 
pattern can be interpreted to lessen the value of the observation from Model 1, with Model 2 
implying that there is no difference in the way PE-backed and non-PE-backed issuers start or 
stop paying out dividends in the three years following the bond issuance (Huang et al., 2016).  
 
To analyze the dividend payout policies of private equity-sponsored bond issuers further, I look 
into Models 3-5 of Panel A, which cover three different model specifications on the relative 
size of the dividend payout. I find that the coefficient of PE_DUMt in two of the model 
specifications (DIV_PAYOUTt,t+2 and DIV_YIELDt,t+2), yield a both economically and 
statistically significant result. The coefficients -19.723 and -2.593, respectively, imply that, 
when compared to the dividend payouts of non-PE-sponsored firms, PE-backed bond issuers 
pay out 19.7 pp less in dividends relative to their income before extraordinary items (income 
before NRI) for the financial year and pay out a 2.6 pp lower dividend per share relative to the 
end-of-the-year share price of the company. Both findings are averages over the three years 
after the bond issuance and statistically significant at the 10% significance level.  
 
Interestingly, the total dividend payout relative to the total assets of a firm (DIV/ASSETSt,t+2) 
does not significantly differ for PE-backed firms from the rest of the bond issuers in the sample. 
Contrasting my European results with the US-based study of Huang et al. (2016), Models 3-5 
yield very similar results. After controlling for the lagged dividend payout variables, Huang et 
al. (2016) find that private equity-backed companies pay out 10.4 pp less in dividends relative 
to their income before NRI for the financial year, as well as pay out 0.6 pp less in dividends 
relative to the total assets of the company. Both of their findings are significant at the 10% level. 
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Further, when studying the control variables used in the Models, their coefficients are largely 
of the same sing in my European analysis as they are in the US-based study of Huang et al. 
(2016).  
 
Overall, my European analysis PE portfolio company dividend policy analysis yields the 
following implication in the [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period; private equity-backed 
companies are generally more likely to pay out dividends in the three years following a bond 
issuance. However, when controlling for the lagged dividend payer variable, PE-sponsored 
companies are no more likely to start or stop paying out dividends over the three-year period 
after the bond issuance than the rest of the companies in the sample are. Further, the results 
imply that actually, the total dividends paid out by private equity-owned companies are smaller 
relative to their income before NRI and the dividend per share is lower relative to their end-of-
the-year share price when compared to the non-PE-backed firms in the sample. Thus, I can 
fairly comfortably suggest that private equity-owned companies do not resort to overly 
excessive dividend payouts after a large influx of capital through a bond issuance.  
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Table 9. Dividend policy changes after a bond issuance – Logit and Tobit regression analysis results  
 
This table presents the Logit (1-2, 6-7) and Tobit (3-5, 8-10) regression results of the analysis of dividend policy changes 
following a bond issuance for both the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample (1-5) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample 
(6-10), that cover all bonds issued between immediately after and a maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public 
offering date. The analysis is run with the four following dependent variables; DIV_PAYER_DUMt,t+2 is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if the issuer has paid a dividend in at least one of the three years (bond issue year t and two preceding 
financial years t+1, t+2 for all) and taking the value 0 otherwise, DIV_PAYOUTt,t+2 is the three-year average of common 
dividend divided by end-of-year income before extraordinary items, DIV_YIELDt,t+2 is the three-year average of dividend per 
share divided by the end-of-year share price in a given year and DIV/ASSETSt,t+2 is the three-year average of common dividend 
divided by the total assets at the beginning of the bond issue year. Coefficients and z- and t-statistics are reported for 
independent variables. PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond issuer was backed by a 
private equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions for the 
remaining independent variables are provided in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and z- and t-statistics for the bond period 
dummy variables (BOND_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific 
dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. Tobit regressions are run with a lower limit of zero. The 
analysis is conducted with robust standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the bond issuer 
level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 
10% level in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6]
Dependent Variable DIV_PAYER_DUM t,t+2 DIV_PAYOUT t,t+2 DIV_YIELD t,t+2 DIV/ASSETS t,t+2
Model # 1 2 3 4 5
Independent Variables coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t 2.727 ** 0.021 4.811 0.131 -19.723 * 0.091 -2.593 * 0.063 0.346 0.135
TANGIBILITY t-1 3.295 0.104 0.248 0.938 -45.793 *** 0.006 -2.993 * 0.061 -0.343 0.299
M_CAP t-1 0.583 * 0.065 1.022 ** 0.013 0.216 *** 0.003 0.002 0.734 -0.005 ** 0.045
AGE t 0.006 0.647 -0.204 ** 0.024 0.191 0.248 -0.018 0.206 0.000 0.984
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 3.446 ** 0.038 7.418 ** 0.019 -12.989 0.284 -3.287 0.281 0.234 0.120
ROA t-1 4.758 0.617 -6.359 0.548 136.893 * 0.076 -4.186 0.706 5.777 *** 0.000
LOSS_DUM t-1 -0.715 0.528 -2.977 *** 0.000 -20.794 0.361 -3.140 0.160 0.078 0.693
LEVERAGE t-1 3.488 ** 0.048 -1.140 0.745 18.014 0.437 -1.026 0.683 -0.579 0.166
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 -1.272 *** 0.002 -2.592 0.154 -5.584 0.195 -1.289 ** 0.031 0.243 * 0.080
UTILITY_DUM t 0.985 *** 0.010
FINANCIAL_DUM t -0.360 ** 0.030
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t 0.609 *** 0.002 -1.903 0.622 12.659 0.451 2.005 0.180 -0.046 0.894
RETURN t -0.229 0.742 2.248 0.117 -10.122 0.266 0.522 0.429 0.369 ** 0.027
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 11.133 *** 0.000
DIV_PAYOUT t-1 0.039 0.230
DIV_YIELD t-1 1.144 * 0.062
DIV/ASSETS t-1 0.394 *** 0.000
n 429 429 485 483 467
Pseudo R
2
0.417 0.868 0.025 0.044 0.435
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Table 9. (Continuing) 
 
 
 
Panel B of Table 9, on the other hand, reports the findings from the larger [IPO+0, IPO+12] 
sample. I can observe that the findings from Panel A do not hold in the full sampling period, as 
the coefficients for PE_DUMt in Models 6-10 remain statistically insignificant. Interestingly, 
however, when analyzing the economic significance of the PE_DUMt coefficients in all 
specifications, I can note that they are in of the same sign as in the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
sample, but slightly smaller in magnitude. Both the statistical and economic significance of the 
coefficient for the private equity dummy variable in Models 6-10 provide evidence that in the 
full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample, dividend payout policies of PE-backed companies do not 
significantly differ from those of the remaining sample of companies.  
 
Table 10 portrays the similar dividend policy analysis, but studies the dividend policy changes 
after a three-year period following a loan withdrawal rather than a bond issuance, with Panel A 
of Table 10 showing the results of the analysis conducted with the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
sample. The coefficient of PE_DUMt is statistically insignificant in both Models 1 and 2, which 
implies that private equity-sponsored companies are not more or less likely to pay out dividends 
at all in the three years following the loan withdrawal than their non-PE-backed peers in the 
sample. Further, the PE_DUMt coefficients in Models 3 and 4 are both statistically insignificant 
and economically relatively questionable, as in the DIV_PAYOUTt,t+2 specification the 
Panel B
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable DIV_PAYER_DUM t,t+2 DIV_PAYOUT t,t+2 DIV_YIELD t,t+2 DIV/ASSETS t,t+2
Model # 6 7 8 9 10
Independent Variables coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t 0.911 0.295 1.244 0.341 -8.695 0.568 -1.298 0.111 0.197 0.392
TANGIBILITY t-1 1.311 0.356 -3.196 0.143 4.172 0.850 0.587 0.553 -0.293 0.318
M_CAP t-1 0.012 0.276 0.028 *** 0.006 0.132 0.411 0.006 0.476 0.001 0.708
AGE t -0.010 0.425 -0.026 * 0.052 -0.038 0.871 -0.011 0.377 0.001 0.560
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 1.394 0.175 0.675 0.646 11.347 0.524 -0.720 0.309 0.178 0.347
ROA t-1 7.774 * 0.061 -2.103 0.562 11.078 0.872 5.607 0.488 3.490 ** 0.036
LOSS_DUM t-1 -0.384 0.676 -2.083 ** 0.012 -33.573 * 0.066 -1.046 0.494 -0.112 0.516
LEVERAGE t-1 3.196 * 0.061 0.250 0.924 67.099 ** 0.013 2.373 0.277 -0.343 0.256
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 -0.216 0.578 -0.938 * 0.076 -2.359 0.682 -1.085 *** 0.005 0.252 ** 0.048
UTILITY_DUM t 0.374 0.115
FINANCIAL_DUM t -0.744 *** 0.000
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t -0.040 0.978 -0.224 0.885 -14.731 0.509 -0.241 0.892 0.094 0.749
RETURN t -0.584 0.227 0.917 0.176 -36.738 ** 0.036 0.993 0.313 0.140 0.282
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 9.881 *** 0.000
DIV_PAYOUT t-1 -0.004 * 0.100
DIV_YIELD t-1 0.212 ** 0.031
DIV/ASSETS t-1 0.270 *** 0.006
n 1197 1197 1247 1245 1197
Pseudo R
2
0.446 0.857 0.024 0.029 0.393
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coefficient is fairly extreme at -55.314 and in the DIV_YIELDt,t+2 specification rather low at 
0.359. However, I do observe a statistically significant PE_DUMt coefficient of -1.415 for 
Model 5, which implies that, at the 10% significance level, private equity-owned companies 
pay out 1.4 pp less in dividends relative to the total assets of the company, when compared to 
the non-sponsor-owned firms in the sample.  
 
Panel B of Table 10 shows the results for the analysis on dividend policy changes following a 
loan withdrawal in the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample. Contrary to the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
sample, the coefficients PE_DUMt are statistically significant at the 5% level in Models 1 and 
2. This implicitly suggests that private equity-backed firms are less likely to pay out dividends 
compared to their non-PE-sponsored counterparties up to 12 years since their initial public 
offering, although no such payout policy was observed in the period lasting up to 6 years since 
the company’s IPO. Further, the statistically significant (at the 5% level) and economically 
relative extreme (-80.183) coefficient of in PE_DUMt Model 3 also implies that PE-backed 
firms pay out 80.2 pp less in dividends relative to their income before NRI for the financial 
year, when compared the non-PE-backed companies in the sample. Analysis run on Models 4 
& 5, on the other hand, do not yield a statistically significant coefficient for the private equity 
dummy variable, suggesting further that the dividend yield and the total dividend payout 
relative to the PE-backed borrower’s total assets does not significantly differ from the non-PE-
sponsored firms.  
 
I do not observe any of the results of the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample in the focused [IPO+0, 
IPO+6] sample for corporate loan withdrawals or in the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample for bond 
issuances. Thus, it is speculatively safer to note that I do not confidently capture the true effect 
of private equity ownership on the portfolio companies’ dividend policies following a loan 
withdrawal. Given the overall relatively illogical nature of the dividend policy analysis, that the 
observation is rather a sample size issue or PE_DUMt captures some other variation in the data 
occurring only in the full sampling period. Thereby, I conclude on a speculative note, that I am 
unable to determine the true dividend policy effect following a loan withdrawal, but given the 
solid results obtained from the debt capital markets sample, I do not find evidence of 
excessively high dividends paid out to the private equity owners following a debt issuance.  
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Table 10. Dividend policy changes after a loan withdrawal – Logit and Tobit regression analysis results  
 
This table presents the Logit (1-2, 6-7) and Tobit (3-5, 8-10) regression results of the analysis of dividend policy changes 
following a loan withdrawal for both the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample (1-5) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample 
(6-10), that cover all loans issued between immediately after and a maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public 
offering date. The analysis is run with the four following dependent variables; DIV_PAYER_DUMt,t+2 is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 if the issuer has paid a dividend in at least one of the three years (loan withdrawal year t and two preceding 
financial years t+1, t+2 for all) and taking the value 0 otherwise, DIV_PAYOUTt,t+2 is the three-year average of common 
dividend divided by end-of-year income before extraordinary items, DIV_YIELDt,t+2 is the three-year average of dividend per 
share divided by the end-of-year share price in a given year and DIV/ASSETSt,t+2 is the three-year average of common dividend 
divided by the total assets at the beginning of the loan withdrawal year. Coefficients and z- and t-statistics are reported for 
independent variables. PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the borrower was backed by a 
private equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions for the 
remaining independent variables are provided in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and z- and t-statistics for the loan period 
dummy variables (LOAN_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific dummy 
variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. Tobit regressions are run with a lower limit of zero. The analysis is 
conducted with robust standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the borrower level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level in 
a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6]
Dependent Variable DIV_PAYER_DUM t,t+2 DIV_PAYOUT t,t+2 DIV_YIELD t,t+2 DIV/ASSETS t,t+2
Model # 1 2 3 4 5
Independent Variables coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t -2.060 0.337 -2.060 0.337 -55.314 0.235 0.359 0.769 -1.415 * 0.063
TANGIBILITY t-1 -4.926 0.133 -4.926 0.133 23.068 0.593 -2.524 ** 0.047 -1.002 0.276
M_CAP t-1 -0.004 0.654 -0.004 0.654 0.433 0.105 0.005 0.513 -0.002 0.726
AGE t 0.110 * 0.053 0.110 * 0.053 -1.257 * 0.094 0.025 0.207 -0.024 ** 0.042
ROA t-1 14.143 0.173 14.143 0.173 712.941 0.357 -8.924 0.231 22.983 ** 0.025
LOSS_DUM t-1 -0.302 0.842 -0.302 0.842 241.135 0.151 -4.840 ** 0.031 2.886 * 0.058
LEVERAGE t-1 4.871 0.286 4.871 0.286 105.025 0.236 2.467 0.177 2.250 * 0.098
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 -0.043 0.922 -0.043 0.922 -17.968 0.309 -2.452 0.440 0.459 0.142
UTILITY_DUM t 1.352 ** 0.032
FINANCIAL_DUM t -0.599 0.434
RETURN t 1.851 0.262 1.851 0.262 -87.951 0.319 -1.221 0.191 -0.464 0.588
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 13.980 *** 0.000
DIV_PAYOUT t-1 -0.014 0.325
DIV_YIELD t-1 0.166 0.136
DIV/ASSETS t-1 0.045 0.123
n 192 192 192 192 189
Pseudo R
2
0.343 0.343 0.077 0.163 0.285
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Table 10. (Continuing) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable DIV_PAYER_DUM t,t+2 DIV_PAYOUT t,t+2 DIV_YIELD t,t+2 DIV/ASSETS t,t+2
Model # 6 7 8 9 10
Independent Variables coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t -1.558 ** 0.019 -1.558 ** 0.019 -80.183 ** 0.036 -1.082 0.436 -0.425 0.495
TANGIBILITY t-1 -0.787 0.704 -0.787 0.704 -28.820 0.550 -0.223 0.873 3.110 0.104
M_CAP t-1 -0.005 0.633 -0.005 0.633 -0.729 0.140 -0.020 0.367 -0.008 0.167
AGE t 0.011 0.485 0.011 0.485 -1.033 * 0.087 0.043 * 0.064 -0.016 * 0.065
ROA t-1 -0.392 0.946 -0.392 0.946 359.280 0.236 -1.313 0.835 16.843 *** 0.003
LOSS_DUM t-1 -1.176 0.269 -1.176 0.269 124.933 0.192 -2.706 ** 0.042 1.916 ** 0.032
LEVERAGE t-1 3.120 * 0.061 3.120 * 0.061 37.305 0.573 2.798 0.111 3.771 *** 0.006
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 -0.182 0.618 -0.182 0.618 -21.898 0.315 -0.130 0.751 0.507 0.108
UTILITY_DUM t 0.105 0.844
FINANCIAL_DUM t 2.298 * 0.088
RETURN t 0.003 0.997 0.003 0.997 -111.379 ** 0.030 -0.843 0.376 0.286 0.640
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 2.010 * 0.059
DIV_PAYOUT t-1 0.013 0.275
DIV_YIELD t-1 0.315 *** 0.000
DIV/ASSETS t-1 -0.001 *** 0.002
n 453 453 453 453 450
Pseudo R
2
0.149 0.149 0.033 0.397 0.124
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5.5 Share repurchase evidence 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the novel analysis on share repurchases after a bond issuance. 
Although share repurchases are a common exit strategy for private equity investors wanting to 
liquidate their remaining holdings in their portfolio companies after an IPO, it does not seem to 
be the case for European private equity-backed companies. When studying the statistical and 
economic significance of the coefficients for the private equity dummy variable PE_DUMt, in 
the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample, I find that they are neither statistically nor economically 
significant in any of the three specifications (Models 1-3). This result also holds in the full 
[IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (Models 4-6), with the sign of the coefficients remaining unchanged 
and the magnitude of the coefficients only changing slightly when moving from the focused 
sample to the full one. The relatively straightforward results of the analysis suggest that the 
there is no support for the statement that the share repurchases made by private equity-backed 
companies would materially differ from those of all the other firms over a 12-year period since 
the company’s IPO. Thus, I can fairly confidently note that European private equity owners do 
not use share repurchases to excessively compensate their ownership with the proceeds from 
the issued bond over the three years following since the issuance.  
 
Table 12, on the other hand, presents the results of the same analysis conducted with the 
corporate loan sample. Very similar to the results observed in the case of the narrower [IPO+0, 
IPO+6] debt capital markets sample, I find no evidence that private equity-backed companies 
would be more likely to do share repurchases over the next three years after a loan withdrawal 
(Model 1). Further, with statistically and economically insignificant PE_DUMt coefficients of 
Models 2 & 3, I can also note that total share repurchases relative to the PE-backed company’s 
income before NRI and total assets do not statistically differ from the share repurchases made 
by non-PE-sponsored firms. Although the coefficients of PE_DUMt slightly flip in sign and 
magnitude, when moving to the [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period, plausibly a result of the 
rather limited sample size in the [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample, all PE_DUMt coefficients in Models 
4-6 continue to be statistically insignificant. Thereby, I may conclude that private equity-owned 
companies do not perform share repurchases after a loan withdrawal any more than their non-
PE-sponsored peer companies.  
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Table 11. Share repurchases after a bond issuance – Logit and Tobit regression analysis results 
 
This table presents the Logit (1, 4) and Tobit (2-3, 5-6) regression results of the analysis of share repurchases following a bond 
issuance for both the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample (1-3) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (4-6), that cover 
all bonds issued between immediately after and a maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. 
The analysis is run with the three following dependent variables; SHARE_REPUR_ DUMt,t+2 is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 if the issuer has bought back shares in at least one of the three years (bond issue year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2 for all) and taking the value 0 otherwise, SHARE_REPURt,t+2 is the three-year average of share repurchases 
divided by end-of-year income before extraordinary items and SHARE_REPUR/ASSETSt,t+2 is the three-year average of share 
repurchases divided by the total assets at the beginning of the bond issue year. Coefficients and z- and t-statistics are reported 
for independent variables. PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond issuer was backed by 
a private equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions for the 
remaining independent variables are provided in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and z- and t-statistics for the bond period 
dummy variables (BOND_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific 
dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. Tobit regressions are run with a lower limit of zero. The 
analysis is conducted with robust standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the bond issuer 
level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 
10% level in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6] [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable
SHARE_REPUR_ 
DUM t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR/ 
ASSETS t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR_ 
DUM t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR/ 
ASSETS t,t+2
Model # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Independent Variables coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t -0.542 0.553 -0.921 0.374 0.163 0.845 -0.699 0.309 -0.522 0.399 0.047 0.889
TANGIBILITY t-1 0.334 0.775 -1.240 0.420 -0.016 0.900 0.206 0.800 -2.455 0.170 0.003 * 0.076
M_CAP t-1 -0.051 * 0.057 -0.004 0.348 0.000 0.523 -0.009 0.275 0.001 0.896 -0.001 ** 0.040
AGE t -0.014 0.252 -0.014 0.331 0.000 0.527 -0.015 0.108 -0.007 0.372 0.000 0.550
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 0.552 0.417 0.288 0.466 0.025 0.505 0.100 0.819 -0.343 0.343 -0.055 0.588
ROA t-1 -1.851 0.695 -2.530 0.776 0.098 0.911 -0.832 0.784 -1.894 0.712 0.277 0.145
LOSS_DUM t-1 -0.926 0.452 -0.695 0.374 -0.018 0.766 -0.565 0.421 -2.895 0.253 -0.016 0.716
LEVERAGE t-1 -1.935 0.187 0.398 0.710 -0.090 0.425 -0.218 0.848 -0.390 0.714 -0.019 0.732
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 -0.486 0.256 -0.085 0.735 0.000 0.987 0.116 0.708 0.348 0.414 0.003 0.224
UTILITY_DUM t -0.073 * 0.076 0.035 0.881
FINANCIAL_DUM t -0.122 * 0.052 -0.112 ** 0.042
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t 0.697 0.593 -0.007 0.995 0.222 0.212 0.407 0.688 1.067 0.407 0.343 0.141
RETURN t -0.535 0.251 -0.011 0.974 0.015 0.667 -0.773 * 0.085 -0.538 0.414 -0.025 0.377
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 3.858 0.000 3.670 *** 0.000
SHARE_REPUR t-1 -0.029 0.423 -0.001 0.957
SHARE_REPUR/ASSETS t-1 0.035 0.242 0.059 *** 0.002
n 454 485 467 1230 1247 1197
Pseudo R
2
0.545 0.030 0.051 0.585 0.014 0.977
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Table 12. Share repurchases after a loan withdrawal – Logit and Tobit regression analysis results 
 
This table presents the Logit (1, 4) and Tobit (2-3, 5-6) regression results of the analysis of share repurchases following a loan 
withdrawal for both the narrower [IPO+0, IPO+6] sample (1-3) as well as for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample (4-6), that cover 
all loans issued between immediately after and a maximum of 6 or 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. 
The analysis is run with the three following dependent variables; SHARE_REPUR_ DUMt,t+2 is a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 if the issuer has bought back shares in at least one of the three years (loan withdrawal year t and two preceding financial 
years t+1, t+2 for all) and taking the value 0 otherwise, SHARE_REPURt,t+2 is the three-year average of share repurchases 
divided by end-of-year income before extraordinary items and SHARE_REPUR/ASSETSt,t+2 is the three-year average of share 
repurchases divided by the total assets at the beginning of the loan withdrawal year. Coefficients and z- and t-statistics are 
reported for independent variables. PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the borrower was 
backed by a private equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. Definitions 
for the remaining independent variables are provided in Table 1. For brevity, coefficients and z- and t-statistics for the loan 
period dummy variables (LOAN_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific 
dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the table. Tobit regressions are run with a lower limit of zero. The 
analysis is conducted with robust standard errors correcting for heteroscedasticity and the sample is clustered at the borrower 
level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 
10% level in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample [IPO+0, IPO+6] [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Dependent Variable
SHARE_REPUR_ 
DUM t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR/ 
ASSETS t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR_ 
DUM t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR t,t+2
SHARE_REPUR/ 
ASSETS t,t+2
Model # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Independent Variables coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |z| coeff. P > |t| coeff. P > |t|
PE_DUM t -0.047 0.966 0.811 0.848 -0.513 0.241 0.930 0.127 2.051 0.668 0.170 0.490
TANGIBILITY t-1 -0.173 0.925 -9.848 ** 0.031 -1.001 ** 0.012 1.150 0.343 -5.880 0.263 0.124 0.671
M_CAP t-1 -0.009 0.296 -0.026 0.201 -0.002 0.235 -0.018 * 0.079 0.011 0.733 -0.002 0.308
AGE t -0.032 0.240 -0.025 0.610 -0.007 0.117 -0.019 ** 0.044 -0.135 ** 0.012 -0.007 *** 0.010
ROA t-1 -3.344 0.510 37.005 ** 0.012 4.526 ** 0.041 -8.375 ** 0.034 28.603 0.443 -0.409 0.837
LOSS_DUM t-1 -0.781 0.384 0.427 0.862 0.135 0.630 -0.947 0.274 5.390 0.312 -0.107 0.554
LEVERAGE t-1 -2.023 0.340 -11.708 * 0.052 -0.867 * 0.075 -0.923 0.551 -7.184 0.509 -0.035 0.941
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 0.448 * 0.070 1.079 0.264 0.054 0.527 0.420 * 0.078 -1.659 0.659 -0.059 0.622
UTILITY_DUM t -0.494 0.133 -0.246 0.277
FINANCIAL_DUM t -0.794 ** 0.047 -0.470 ** 0.038
RETURN t -0.658 0.375 0.171 0.919 0.312 * 0.087 -0.371 0.479 -1.713 0.608 0.058 0.722
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 5.154 0.025 5.170 *** 0.000
SHARE_REPUR t-1 0.041 0.360 -0.201 0.327
SHARE_REPUR/ ASSETS t-1 . 0.172 0.205 0.379 *** 0.000
n 189 192 189 450 453 450
Pseudo R
2
0.419 0.123 0.269 0.468 0.037 0.209
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5.6 Robustness of results 
 
Two robustness checks were conducted to test the persistence of results in the debt capital 
market and corporate samples in the focused sampling period. First, the analyses were run with 
a data sets where the large bulk of financial sector issuers (SIC codes 6000-6799) were excluded 
from the sample. Further, an alternative robustness check sample that limits the number of 
bonds or loans per company to one and remove all subsequent issues of a given company from 
the sample was also analyzed. Both of the robustness check yielded similar results, where 
possible, while slightly lowering the observed difference between PE-backed and non-PE-
backed companies’ credit ratings and spreads, as financial sector issuers form a significant 
portion of the subsequent issues, as well as issuers in general. Further, Reliability of 
observations from the focused sample of corporate loans was slightly compromised as a result 
of the decrease in sample size. 
 
6. Discussion of results 
 
When contrasting my European findings with those of Huang et al. (2016) conducted with a 
US-based sample, the European capital markets seem to view the involvement of a private 
equity owner in a fairly different way than the North American investors do.  
 
On a general note, the analysis yields the following three main results; first, debt investors 
demand higher yields on European private equity-backed companies’ credit in the first six years 
after the company’s IPO. Bond yield spreads (loan spreads) for European PE-backed companies 
are on average 93 pp (70 pp) higher when comparing to the general set of other IPO companies. 
Second, European private equity-sponsored firms are rated slightly below their non-PE-backed 
peers by Moody’s, who rate PE-sponsored companies’ bonds on average two notches lower 
than their non-sponsor counterparts. Finally, private equity-backed companies invest less and 
pay lower amounts of dividends over the three-year period following a debt issuance relative 
to the size of the firms, when compared to the non-PE-sponsored firms. Empirical evidence 
from the US market suggests that PE-backed companies have better credit ratings, receive bond 
financing with lower yields, invest more modestly and pay out less dividends in the three years 
after a debt issuance, when compared to the non-PE-sponsored companies (Huang et al., 2016). 
Thereby, my analysis yields novel results to the European market on PE-sponsored firms’ credit 
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ratings and cost of debt and confirms the earlier findings by Harford and Kolasinski (2014) and 
Huang et al. (2016) that PE owners do not exploit bondholders by transferring wealth through 
overinvestment and excessive payout policies.  
 
Results from the credit rating analysis provide some evidence for H1 and against H2 as I do see 
evidence that private equity-sponsored companies’ bonds have lower ratings in both sampling 
periods by Moody’s and in the larger sampling period by S&P – a finding that is unique to 
Europe and my study. The result does suggest to some extent that rating agencies view 
European private equity ownership as a credit negative factor, possibly because of their 
exploitative governance structures. The result does not, however, survive in the loan market, 
where neither Moody’s nor S&P ratings were affected by private equity ownership13, perhaps 
suggesting lower information asymmetries between PE investors and banks compared to PE 
owners and bondholders. Further, as repeat borrowers in the fairly bank-centered borrowing 
environment of Europe, private equity investors may view their reputation among their core 
banking group as more valuable than among the general bond investor space. Implicitly, the 
result would support the finding of Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), who suggest that poor 
governance structures, i.e. significant blockholder ownership or CEO power, cause the lower 
credit rating observed for PE-backed companies.  
 
In the yield and loan spread analysis, I do find evidence for H1 and against H2 in the narrower 
[IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling period, and observed higher spreads of PE-backed companies hold 
for both bond yields (93 pp increase) and loan yields (70 pp increase), when compared to non-
PE-baked firms. The same result holds in the larger [IPO+0, IPO+12] sample with the increase 
relative to non-PE-backed companies is 92 pp (93 pp) for PE portfolio firms’ yield spreads 
(loan spreads). This finding does provide evidence for H1 and against H2 to some extent. The 
observation suggests that over the period of up to 6 years from the IPO, private equity-owned 
companies pay significantly more on their debt instruments, when comparing to the entire 
sample of IPO companies. Some factors, however, contribute to the persistence of such high 
spread levels of formerly PE-backed companies in the longer term. The observation could arise 
from the exploitative behavior of the sponsor, but as private equity owners usually tend to exit 
                                                          
13 My corporate loan analysis implied with weak statistical significance that in the focused sampling period, S&P 
ratings were on average 7 notches lower for sponsor-backed companies, when compared to non-PE-backed firms. 
However, as per the discussion in Section 5.1, I consider the extreme result to be more a result of a few outlying 
observations, rather than an implication on PE-backed companies’ exploitative behavior.  
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the companies approximately five years after the IPO, the observation can also be tied to a 
deteriorating governance under a new management team of the former PE portfolio companies 
after the private equity investors have fully exited the firms.  
 
Elysiani et al. (2010) come to the conclusion that the long-term orientation of PE-ownership is 
a key driver in mitigating agency costs and thus reducing the cost of debt. With respect to their 
finding, the observably higher spreads of PE-backed companies may be the result of the 
relatively immature private equity market of Europe (Robinson and Sensoy, 2011). If lenders 
would not have as strong long-term relationships with the private equity owners in Europe as 
they have in the US, the findings of Diamond (1989) on long-term reputation could also further 
explain, why US-based PE-backed companies pay less on their debt than their non-PE-backed 
peers and why the observation is the opposite in Europe. Further, to explain why bond yields 
of PE-backed companies have a higher when compared to the loan spreads of PE-backed firms, 
the observation can be thought to relate to the findings of Hale and Santos (2009). The authors 
conclude that banks have better access to insider non-public information and thus may be better 
in alleviating informational asymmetries arising from the European private equity ownership. 
 
Saunders and Steffen (2011) find that PE-backed companies listing to a relatively small 
secondary marketplace have a higher cost of debt than the non-PE-backed companies do. As 
my European sample consists of 17 European countries with a much greater amount of 
secondary marketplaces, the observation of higher spreads can actually be a result of the 
fragmented capital markets of Europe rather than exploitative governance structures 
implemented by the private equity owner. Barclay et al. (1993) and Aslan and Kumar (2012) 
among others, conclude that the presence of a large blockholder negatively affects the pricing 
of a company’s cost of debt. When applying their finding in the context of European private 
equity-backed companies, it is possible to comment on a speculative note, that PE investors 
retain a significant holding in the company post-IPO and large concentrated PE ownership is 
one possible explanation for the higher spreads observed PE-owned companies’ debt.  
 
Interestingly, the investment policy analysis yields results providing evidence against H3, as 
the capital expenditure levels of private equity-backed companies are lower for the firms in the 
general IPO company sample after a bond issuance, i.e. private equity-sponsored companies 
invest less relative to their size over the next three years after the large influx of capital through 
a bond issuance. Consequently, the investment levels are somewhat higher in the full sampling 
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period, yet still below the non-PE-backed peers, possibly capturing the change in investment 
policies following a PE owner exiting the firm. Findings from the corporate loan sample are 
less strong and investments of PE-backed companies after a loan withdrawal are on average in 
line with those of the non-sponsor-backed companies in the focused sampling period. However, 
the results for the corporate loan sample for the full sampling period are very much in line with 
the observations from the bond market. Evidence against H3 also provides some evidence for 
H2 and against H1, as private equity owners seem to have bondholder-friendly investment 
policies and do not seem to engage in overly excessive investment programs aiming to solely 
maximize the value of their equity ownership. Consequently, the results are in line with those 
of Huang et al. (2016), who also observe the bondholder-friendly investment policies of former 
PE portfolio companies. The result is also in line with Harford and Kolasinski (2014), who find 
that PE owners do not exploit the debtholders of their portfolio companies through excessive 
investment and payout policies.  
 
When it comes to the dividend policies of private equity-backed companies after a bond 
issuance, my findings are also partially in line with those of Huang et al. (2016). I observe that 
private equity-backed companies are more likely to pay dividends in general in the three years 
following the bond issuance, whereas Huang et al. (2016) conclude PE-backed firms are 
actually less likely to pay dividends at all when comparing with the other IPO companies. 
However, similar to Huang et al. (2016), I observe that of the companies that do pay dividends, 
private equity-sponsored firms are more modest in terms of the size of the dividend payout 
compared to the non-PE-backed companies. The result only holds in the focused sampling 
period and the likely payout policy changes can be seen to have an effect on the failure to 
observe the similar pattern in the full sampling period. The results obtained from the corporate 
loan sample are somewhat conflicting in nature, suggesting that my analysis does not capture 
the full dividend policy effect following a loan withdrawal.  
 
The overall finding on PE-backed firms’ dividend policies does provide support against H4 and 
thereby partial support against H1 and for H2, as I see no evidence of PE-backed companies 
paying excessively large dividends to the sponsor owners. Further, the relatively lower dividend 
payments can imply that private equity investors are concerned with their reputation and have 
implemented bondholder friendly payout structures. Alternatively, the relatively lower dividend 
payout levels can be a mere result of the private equity owner wanting to retain a greater portion 
of free cash flow in the growth of the company to further increase the value of its shareholding. 
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The results of my unique share repurchase analysis, which show no evidence of a statistically 
significant difference in share repurchase activities between PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
companies in the next three years after the debt issuance, are not in favor of H5. The result 
suggests that former PE portfolio companies use share repurchases in the similar extent as the 
non-PE-owned companies do, and that private equity-owned companies do not use debt 
proceeds excessively in share repurchases e.g. for exit purposes. The observation holds for both 
bond and loan markets and applies in the narrower as well as in the full sampling period. 
 
My observation of PE-backed companies paying less dividends than the non-sponsor-backed 
companies do seems to be partly in line with Jain et al. (2009), who find that the dividend 
paying companies are less likely to be backed by venture capital firms and that VC-owned 
companies tend to use share repurchases as their preferred payout method. As I fail to detect 
any difference in the share repurchase policies between PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
companies, in light of Maxwell and Stephens (2003), who conclude that share repurchases may 
transfer wealth from bondholders to equity holders, I can safely note that I find no evidence 
supporting the claim that PE owners exploit their bondholders through excessive payout 
policies.  
 
As a whole, the results of the credit rating and spread analyses do show some evidence for the 
Wealth Expropriation Hypothesis and suggest that private equity-backed companies have 
slightly weaker credit performance through lower credit ratings and higher yield spreads. 
However, a deeper follow-up analysis on the use of bond and loan proceeds is more in favor of 
the Reputation Acquisition Hypothesis, as the private equity-backed companies have both more 
modest investment plans and dividend policies relative to the other IPO companies, offering 
support against the Overinvestment Hypothesis, Excessive Dividend Hypothesis and Buyback 
Exit Hypothesis. This can imply that, while the private equity investors are indeed concerned 
about their reputation and do not enforce governance structures that exploit bondholders, other 
characteristics in the private equity ownership or the company characteristics account14 for the 
observed difference in the credit quality between PE-owned and non-PE-owned firms. 
 
 
                                                          
14 For example, PE-backed companies in the sample were smaller in terms of market capitalization, more 
levered, issued larger amounts of debt and were less mature in age, when comparing to the non-PE-backed 
companies 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This thesis studies the reputation effect of European private equity investors. I focus my 
analysis on the European debt capital markets and corporate loan markets by studying the bonds 
and loans issued by PE-backed and non-PE-backed companies from 17 European countries 
during the period between January 1, 1981 and June 30, 2015. I construct the sample by 
distinguishing between whether the debt issuer was backed by a private equity or venture capital 
investors on its IPO and construct two time period samples, the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
sampling period and the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period. 
 
My hypotheses revolve around the reputational concerns of private equity owners and their 
implications on the PE portfolio firms’ bond and loan metrics. Wealth Expropriation 
Hypothesis suggests PE owners aim to maximize the value of their ownership and thus exploit 
the debtholders of the firm, which leads to an increase in the PE portfolio firm’s cost of debt. 
Reputation Acquisition Hypothesis, on the other hand, implies that PE owners value their 
reputation highly and are willing to implement bondholder-friendly governance structures that 
lower the cost of debt for their portfolio companies. My three other hypotheses follow up 
exploitative nature of PE ownership and study the investment and payout policies of private 
equity-backed companies following the debt issuance. Overinvestment Hypothesis suggests PE-
backed companies invest in too risky projects after their IPO, Excessive Dividend Hypothesis 
implies PE-backed companies pay high dividends to their owners after a debt issuance and 
Buyback Exit Hypothesis indicates PE-owned companies to increase share repurchases 
following a bond issuance or loan withdrawal. 
 
I test my hypotheses by creating a private equity dummy variable (PE_DUMt) that takes the 
value 1 if the debt issuing company was backed by a private equity investor on its IPO and zero 
otherwise. I then run a series of multivariate analyses studying the relationship of private equity 
ownership and different credit metrics of the bonds and loans (credit ratings, bond yield spread 
and loan spread) as well as study the investment and payout policy changes (capital expenditure, 
dividends and share repurchases) over the three years following a bond or loan issuance. 
 
My analysis yields three main results; first, bond yield spreads (loan spreads) for European PE-
backed companies are on average 93 pp (70 pp) higher when comparing to the general set of 
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other IPO companies over the first six years after their IPO. Second, European private equity-
sponsored firms are rated on average two notches lower than their non-sponsor counterparts by 
Moody’s during the first six years after the company has been listed. Finally, private equity-
backed companies invest less and pay lower amounts of dividends over the three-year period 
following a debt issuance relative to the size of the firms, when compared to the non-PE-
sponsored firms. When contrasting my results to a similar US-based study of Huang et al. 
(2016), I find that debt investors to view European private equity ownership somewhat 
differently from the North American PE ownership. 
 
Although I find that European private equity-owned companies are viewed inherently riskier in 
terms of their credit metrics compared to the non-sponsor-backed firms, I observe no evidence 
of exploitative governance structures in PE-backed companies and suggest that the reputation 
effect plays a vital role in ensuring that bondholder friendly governance structures are 
implemented in PE portfolio companies.  
 
As the scope of this thesis extends to analyzing how private equity investors’ reputational 
concerns affect its credit metrics. While no exploitative governance structures were observed, 
PE-backed companies are still implicitly rated below their non-PE-backed peers and PE 
portfolio companies pay higher spreads on their financing, the inherent question of why this is 
observed is left unanswered. Topics for further research include studying the fundamentals of 
private equity ownership further to better understand the underlying mechanism that affects the 
observed credit metrics. Further, another topic to consider is to complement the findings of this 
thesis and that of Huang et al. (2016) by constructing a study on the loan market implication 
from the North American market and introducing share repurchases as a possible exploitative 
payout method after a bond or loan issuance. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A – Descriptive statistics for [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period 
 
Table 13 presents the descriptive statistics for the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period for 
both the debt capital markets and corporate debt data sets. By looking at the descriptive statistics 
for the focused [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period presented in Table 13 (Panel A), I note that 
the mean and median credit ratings of PE-sponsored firms for both S&P and Moody’s are 
observably lower than the ratings of the non-PE-backed companies. A similar observation holds 
also for yield spreads, as the mean and median yield spread is noticeably higher for PE-backed 
companies when compared to the non-PE-backed firms of the sample. However, in the case of 
loan spreads, PE-backed firms have noticeably lower mean and median spreads when compared 
to the non-PE-backed companies. Other mentionable findings from the [IPO+0, IPO+12] 
statistics (Panel B) are very similar to those observed in the focused [IPO+0, IPO+6] sampling 
period, as sponsor-backed firms are more levered and smaller in terms of market capitalization 
when compared to the non-PE-backed companies, even up to 12 years since the company’s 
IPO. Further, sponsor-backed companies continue to issue larger debt instruments and are 
observably younger on issuance than their non-sponsor-backed peer companies are. Maturities 
of the instruments are remain equal for PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms and PE-backed 
companies stock returns seem to observably outperform the stock returns of the non-PE-backed 
firms over a one-year period before the bond issue date.  
 
Comparison between the PE-backed firms in the debt capital markets sample and corporate loan 
sample in the full sampling period also yield similar results to the findings in [IPO+0, IPO+6] 
sampling period. I find that the raised loan amounts are larger than the financing raised through 
bonds and maturities on withdrawn loans are shorter than on issued bonds, with companies 
taking loan financing also being slightly older than the firms issuing bonds are. Additionally, 
the PE-backed firms in the corporate loan sample continue to be larger in terms of market 
capitalization than companies in the debt capital markets sample. Contrary to the focused 
sample, PE-backed companies withdrawing loans in the full sampling period are less likely to 
make a loss than the bond-issuing sponsor-backed are.  
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Table 13. Descriptive statistics for post-IPO bond issuances and loan withdrawals – [IPO+0, IPO+12] 
 
This table presents the sample sizes, medians and means of both the dependent variables (Panel A) and independent variables 
(Panel B) used in this study. The table shows statistics for both the final debt capital markets sample and the final corporate 
loan sample in the full [IPO+0, IPO+12] sampling period that cover all bonds and loans issued between immediately after and 
a maximum of 12 years since a given firm’s initial public offering date. For both samples, the statistics are reported separately 
for the PE-backed IPOs (i.e. PE_DUMt taking the value 1) and for all the IPOs in a given sample (i.e. PE_DUMt taking either 
the value 0 or 1). PE_DUMt is the private equity dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bond issuer was backed by a private 
equity or venture capital sponsor on its initial public offering and taking the value 0 otherwise. For brevity, statistics for the 
bond period dummy variables (BOND_PERIOD_DUMi), loan period dummy variables (LOAN_PERIOD_DUMi), IPO period 
dummy variables (IPO_PERIOD_DUMi) and country-specific dummy variables (COUNTRY_DUMi) are not reported in the 
table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
Sample Debt Capital Markets [IPO+0, IPO+12] Corporate Loan [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Subsample PE-Backed IPOs All IPOs PE-Backed IPOs All IPOs
n 105 1249 96 453
Dependent Variables Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
S&P_RATING t 10.000 9.830 14.000 13.715 9.000 9.450 11.000 10.846
MOODY’S_RATING t 7.500 8.811 15.000 14.381 8.000 8.342 11.000 10.976
YIELD_SPREAD t 238.010 272.621 76.870 100.598
LOAN_SPREAD t 38.000 115.976 90.000 132.277
CAPEX/TANG t,t+2 0.128 38.720 4.159 22.882 -6.786 166.648 7.610 17.219
CAPEX/AT t,t+2 3.853 4.979 2.644 4.199 5.034 5.411 5.639 6.665
(CAPEX+RD)/AT t,t+2 4.531 5.444 2.922 4.467 5.610 5.828 6.130 7.153
DIV_PAYER_DUM t,t+2 1.000 0.885 1.000 0.778 1.000 0.786 1.000 0.934
DIV_PAYOUT t,t+2 34.498 40.464 28.659 66.457 33.516 31.263 38.085 133.892
DIV_YIELD t,t+2 2.174 2.459 3.262 4.377 2.883 1.975 3.061 5.529
DIV/ASSETS t,t+2 1.588 1.853 0.420 1.412 2.001 1.907 1.864 3.002
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t,t+2 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.355
SHARE_REPUR t,t+2 0.000 10.946 0.000 4.862 0.000 5.604 0.000 6.510
SHARE_REPUR/ASSETS t,t+2 0.000 0.730 0.000 0.288 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.463
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Table 13. (Continuing)  
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B
Sample Debt Capital Markets [IPO+0, IPO+12] Corporate Loan [IPO+0, IPO+12]
Subsample PE-Backed IPOs All IPOs PE-Backed IPOs All IPOs
n 105 1249 96 453
Independent Variables Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean
PE_DUM t 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.084 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.212
DEFAULT_SPREAD t 101.200 100.389 106.100 123.253
PROCEEDS t 0.444 1.381 0.304 0.742 0.740 0.870 0.737 1.624
MATURITY t 7.036 9.324 7.022 8.145 5.003 4.424 5.003 3.974
EXTENDABLE_DUM t 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.126
REVOLVER_DUM t 0.500 0.452 1.000 0.543
SUBORD_DUM t 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009
FIRST_BOND_DUM t 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.122
FIRST_LOAN_DUM t 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.170
TOTAL_BONDS t 2.000 2.951 11.000 30.902
TOTAL_LOANS t 5.000 8.000 4.000 6.848
M_CAP t-1 3.700 4.177 13.093 27.990 5.453 5.360 6.451 17.562
AGE t 12.510 21.778 22.115 36.646 13.045 22.428 14.019 27.037
ROA t-1 0.033 0.023 0.009 0.023 0.042 0.046 0.043 0.046
LOSS_DUM t-1 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.095
ICR 0,t-1 3.910 2.942 1.999 3.398 4.531 3.786 3.598 4.747
ICR 5,t-1 0.000 1.056 0.000 1.858 0.000 1.067 0.000 2.535
ICR 10,t-1 0.000 0.374 0.000 1.702 0.000 0.469 0.000 2.375
ICR 20,t-1 0.000 0.224 0.000 1.947 0.000 0.174 0.000 3.184
LEVERAGE t-1 0.304 0.408 0.215 0.238 0.395 0.399 0.337 0.351
MARKET_TO_BOOK t-1 1.174 1.290 0.526 0.754 1.616 1.591 1.154 1.294
TANGIBILITY t-1 -0.009 -0.024 0.039 0.079 -0.106 -0.017 0.108 0.079
UTILITY_DUM t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.168
FINANCIAL_DUM t 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.493 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.135
SOVEREIGN_RATING t 19.000 18.475 19.000 18.384 19.000 18.000 19.000 17.274
NET_DEBT t 0.000 0.038 0.007 0.064 0.028 0.104 0.026 0.073
SUBSIDIARY_DUM t 0.000 0.246 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.077
RETURN t 0.075 0.099 0.033 0.045 0.005 0.026 0.016 0.051
CAPEX/TANG t-1 -4.329 -24.681 4.387 30.427 -3.343 68.785 10.108 105.185
CAPEX/AT t-1 3.807 4.878 2.634 4.986 5.759 5.666 5.778 6.891
(CAPEX+RD)/AT t-1 4.427 5.390 3.069 5.377 6.495 6.096 6.200 7.338
DIV_PAYER_DUM t-1 1.000 0.541 1.000 0.711 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.457
DIV_PAYOUT t-1 23.249 32.544 23.914 60.825 0.000 47.190 0.000 185.134
DIV_YIELD t-1 1.834 2.259 2.685 3.668 1.931 1.219 2.393 7.427
DIV/ASSETS t-1 0.897 0.750 0.341 1.372 0.000 2.225 0.000 27.979
SHARE_REPUR_DUM t-1 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.429 0.000 0.238
SHARE_REPUR t-1 0.000 0.711 0.000 3.404 0.000 5.152 0.000 4.210
SHARE_REPUR/ASSETS t-1 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.264 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.308
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